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Marital Supremacy and the Constitution
of the Nonmarital Family
Serena Mayeri*
Despite a transformative half century of social change, marital
status still matters. The marriage equality movement has drawn
attention to the many benefits conferred in law by marriage at a time
when the “marriage gap” between affluent and poor Americans
widens and rates of nonmarital childbearing soar. This Essay
explores the contested history of marital supremacy—the legal
privileging of marriage—through the lens of the “illegitimacy” cases
of the 1960s and 1970s. Often remembered as a triumph for
nonmarital families, these decisions defined the constitutional harm
of illegitimacy classifications as the unjust punishment of innocent
children for the “sins” of their parents. By reaffirming the legitimacy
of governmental objectives such as discouraging illicit sex and
promoting traditional marriage, courts obscured the ways in which
marital supremacy injured adults as well as children, reinforcing
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racial, gender, and economic inequality and circumscribing sexual
and reproductive freedom.
Using court documents and archival sources, this Essay
uncovers alternative visions of the harm of illegitimacy penalties
offered by advocates and activists who framed these laws and
practices as centrally connected to poverty, systemic racial
oppression, and the subordination of women. Civil rights and poverty
lawyers spotlighted the disparate impact of illegitimacy penalties on
poor families of color, especially African Americans in the South.
Feminists emphasized how these laws disproportionately burdened
women—who often bore primary responsibility for nonmarital
children’s care and support—curtailing their sexual, reproductive,
and economic freedom. The failure of these broader accounts of the
harms of illegitimacy penalties to influence judicial opinions
impoverished our constitutional politics in ways that reverberate
today. In a world where marriage is both a privileged status and a
status of the privileged, marriage equality that rests upon nonmarriage’s ignominy risks reinforcing the many other status
inequalities that taint the legacy of marital supremacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite a transformative half century of social change, marital status still
matters. The marriage equality movement has drawn attention to the many
benefits the law confers on married couples, from parental rights to
immigration preferences to tax breaks and public entitlements. 1 Marital
supremacy 2—the legal privileging of marriage—endures, despite soaring rates
of nonmarital childbearing and a widening “marriage gap” that divides
Americans by race, wealth, and education. 3 The stakes of marital supremacy
are higher than ever as marriage becomes the province of the privileged.
Yet marital supremacy has a contested history. This Essay explores the
surprisingly neglected story of constitutional challenges to “illegitimacy”-based
classifications, 4 and to other “illegitimacy penalties,” 5 in the 1960s and 1970s.
During this period, the Supreme Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to
laws that discriminated against “illegitimate” children in areas such as
wrongful death recovery, workers’ compensation, child support, inheritance,

1. On the long history of marriage’s public significance, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000).
2. In this Essay, I use the term “marital supremacy” to refer broadly to the legal privileging of
marriage over non-marriage, and marital over nonmarital families. For other uses of the term, see, for
example, ELIZABETH FREEMAN, THE WEDDING COMPLEX: FORMS OF BELONGING IN MODERN
AMERICAN CULTURE (2002); ELIZABETH H. PLECK, NOT JUST ROOMMATES: COHABITATION AFTER
THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (2012); Serena Mayeri, The Status of Marriage: Marital Supremacy
Challenged and Remade, 1960–2000 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
3. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014).
4. I use the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” advisedly, without wishing to endorse in
any way their denigration of nonmarital families. Where possible, I substitute the (also imperfect) term
“nonmarital,” but when discussing legal status, only legitimate and illegitimate accurately capture the
categories that distinguish the treatment of (some) nonmarital children from that of other children.
Similarly, the term “marital children” does not accurately describe all children considered legally
legitimate, since legitimacy can result from the operation of various legal presumptions or, in recent
times, from post hoc legal processes of legitimation.
5. “Illegitimacy penalties” include laws that distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
children (often called “illegitimacy-based classifications”) as well as other laws and practices that
impose disadvantages on nonmarital children and their parents, such as bans on the employment of
nonmarital parents; laws requiring unmarried mothers to disclose the identities of their children’s
fathers; “suitable home” and substitute father laws withholding welfare benefits because of a mother’s
nonmarital sexual relationship; and the exclusion of unmarried mothers from “mother’s insurance”
benefits under the Social Security Act. Lawsuits challenging these illegitimacy penalties rarely appear
on lists of the illegitimacy cases decided in the 1960s and 1970s; including them exposes the wider
range of constitutional arguments advocates made about the consequences of marital supremacy and
illuminates the stakes of the Court’s approach to illegitimacy.
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and government benefits. 6 These decisions followed and prompted statutory
reforms that mitigated many of the harshest legal disabilities historically
imposed upon nonmarital children. 7
The illegitimacy cases are often remembered as a triumph for nonmarital
families, a long overdue recognition of children’s humanity irrespective of
birth status. 8 But these decisions hardly championed the equal status of adults
who lived outside the bonds of marriage. The constitutional harm of
illegitimacy classifications, according to the Justices, lay in the punishment of
“hapless” and “innocent” children for the “sins” or “transgressions” of their
parents. 9
The illegitimacy cases reshaped, but did not vanquish, marital supremacy.
By focusing on the blamelessness of children, these decisions not only
obscured the constitutional harms of illegitimacy penalties’ detrimental impact
on adults, but also ignored how these laws reinforced broader racial, sexual,
and socioeconomic inequities that impoverished entire families. 10 The Court
found nothing unconstitutional about discouraging illicit sex and promoting
traditional marriage. Rather, to the extent illegitimacy classifications violated
equal protection, their infirmity lay in the tenuous relationship between means
(punishing innocent children) and ends (deterring adult misconduct). 11

6. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
7. Scholars generally, and historians in particular, have paid relatively little attention to the
illegitimacy cases. For recent exceptions in the legal literature, see Susan Frelich Appleton,
Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347 (2012); Martha F.
Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73 (2003); Katie R.
Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527
(2014); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New
Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012); Allison Anna Tait, A Tale of Three
Families: Historical Households, Earned Belonging, and Natural Connections, 63 HASTINGS L.J.
1345 (2012); Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality, 42 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 547 (2014). There is one book-length study of the cases by political scientists, which
analyzes the decisions but does not draw upon archival sources. MARTHA T. ZINGO & KEVIN E.
EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS: LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARITAL CHILDREN IN THE
UNITED STATES (1994).
8. For critical perspectives, see, for example, ZINGO & EARLY, supra note 7; Davis, supra
note 7; Murray, supra note 7; see also Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure
for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (2015) (“In family law, the marital family serves
as a misleading synecdoche for all families, not only marginalizing nonmarital families but also
actively undermining their already tenuous bonds.”).
9. For a historical perspective on the dangers of invoking innocent children to achieve policy
reform, see Linda Gordon, The Perils of Innocence, or What’s Wrong With Putting Children First, 1 J.
HIST. CHILDHOOD & YOUTH 331 (2008).
10. See Davis, supra note 7, at 92.
11. Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972)
(observing that the Court avoided making difficult normative judgments about morals regulations by
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But this was far from the only available account of illegitimacy
classifications’ harms, constitutional and otherwise. Advocates initially framed
illegitimacy penalties as centrally connected to poverty and to systemic racial
oppression. As feminist advocacy generated new constitutional sex equality
arguments, activists and lawyers emphasized the disproportionate burden
illegitimacy penalties imposed on unmarried mothers who often bore sole
responsibility for the care and support of nonmarital children. Opponents of
illegitimacy penalties proclaimed, sometimes cautiously but occasionally
boldly, a right to sexual freedom outside of marriage. And they questioned,
directly and indirectly, the constitutionality of marital supremacy itself.
Hardly a trace of these arguments about race, sex, sexual liberty, and
economic inequality appears in the Court’s illegitimacy opinions. 12 This
erasure had profound and enduring consequences for nonmarital families—
disproportionately poor and headed by women of color—and for the
contemporary constitutional landscape.
This Essay recovers alternative accounts of the harms of illegitimacy
penalties and explores why these accounts failed to infiltrate constitutional
doctrine and disappeared from historical memory. Part I dives into early
illegitimacy litigation, tracing race discrimination arguments against
illegitimacy penalties through archival and other primary sources. The
plaintiffs in these early cases were African American women and children,
challenging laws with a dramatically disparate impact on poor black families.
Some also attacked illegitimacy penalties as violations of sexual privacy and
liberty. But arguments emphasizing the unfairness of punishing innocent
children for circumstances beyond their control won the day in court. By the
early 1970s, despite other promising constitutional developments for
nonmarital sex, procreation, and familial bonds, a child-focused approach
dominated illegitimacy doctrine.

focusing on how well a law served the government’s stated objective rather than on the legitimacy of
the objective itself).
12. To the extent that the illegitimacy cases and the sex and racial equality cases seem
connected in constitutional law, it is largely by analogy. Like race, the argument goes, illegitimacy
remains outside the individual’s control and should not be a basis for invidious discrimination. And
like sex, illegitimacy classifications are subject to an intermediate standard of equal protection
scrutiny. The canonical constitutional sex equality cases cite to court decisions applying heightened
scrutiny to illegitimacy classifications. But though many of the cases litigated by Ruth Bader Ginsburg
in the 1970s overthrew government support for male supremacy within marriage, turning husbands
and wives into fungible spouses, they did not question marital status as a basis for allocating
government benefits in the first place. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); see also
Serena Mayeri, “The First Order of Business”: Feminists Challenge Male Supremacy in Marriage
(Sept. 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). On Ginsburg’s constitutional
strategy, see SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2011); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010); Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex
Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008).
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Part II describes feminists’ alternative accounts of illegitimacy’s
constitutional harm. Beginning in the early 1970s, feminists argued that
“illegitimate” children’s inability to inherit from their fathers, or to hold them
liable for child support, unjustly placed the entire burden of nonmarital sex,
childbearing, and childrearing on mothers. Illegitimacy penalties such as
mandatory paternity disclosure and bans on hiring unmarried parents also
infringed on women’s decisional autonomy and reproductive freedom. But the
feminist case against illegitimacy penalties never penetrated Supreme Court
rulings. After child-focused arguments reached their apex, the 1970s ended
with a series of defeats for illegitimacy plaintiffs.
Part III investigates why more capacious accounts of illegitimacy’s
constitutional harm fell by the wayside. Accidents of timing and procedural
hurdles played a role, but so did deep reluctance to accept feminist arguments
that challenged assumptions about women’s primary responsibility for
nonmarital children, and about privatized dependency, sexual morality, and
marital supremacy itself. Focusing on illegitimacy penalties’ harm to “hapless”
and “innocent” children provided safe common ground in a polity increasingly
fractured by matters of family structure and sexuality. By the late 1970s, larger
political shifts eroded once promising constitutional doctrines such as sexual
privacy, disparate impact, reproductive freedom, and sex equality.
The illegitimacy cases altered the terms of marital supremacy, to be sure.
But the Court’s failure to question governmental objectives—such as
promoting marriage and deterring illicit relationships—meant that even as
customary norms stigmatizing nonmarital sex and cohabitation eased, even as
white and male supremacy became improper aims of government action, and
even as purposefully punishing nonmarital children no longer passed
constitutional muster, marriage remained a legitimate engine of privilege. By
the turn of the twenty-first century, thousands of material benefits, large and
small, depended on marital status. Constitutional contestation focused on
access to marriage, not upon its legal and social primacy.
The history recounted here has been almost entirely forgotten.
Remembering it exposes the stakes of current struggles to reconcile marriage
equality with other progressive goals. Critics have long worried that
prioritizing marriage sidelined worthier causes and marginalized
nonconforming individuals and families. 13 Marriage equality advocates
attacked restrictions on same-sex marriage with a rich constitutional arsenal
that included powerful arguments about equality, dignity, and autonomy for
13. See, e.g., AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER REVOLUTION, NOT MERE INCLUSION (Ryan
Conrad ed., 2014); NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX,
POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex
Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2008); see also Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV.
J. L. & GENDER 37 n.2 (2011) and sources cited therein.
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gay and lesbian adults and their families. Still, activists, lawmakers, and judges
on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate also invoked innocent children
as primary victims or beneficiaries of same-sex marriage. 14 “Illegitimacy as
injury” 15 made a quiet comeback, implicitly denigrating nonmarital children
and families by reinforcing the superiority of marriage as the sine qua non of
legitimate family formation.
The hard-won triumph of same-sex couples in their struggle for the right
to marry is worthy of joyful celebration. But whether this spectacular
constitutional victory is the harbinger of greater social and material equality for
diverse family forms remains to be seen. In United States v. Windsor, Justice
Anthony Kennedy extolled the unique capacity of legal marriage to allow
couples to “live with pride in themselves and their union,” 16 and to “confer[]
upon them a dignity and status of immense import.” 17 In Obergefell v. Hodges,
he declared, “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage
offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser.” 18 The children of couples who could not marry, he continued, “suffer
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated
through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.” 19
Kennedy’s emphasis on the suffering of blameless nonmarital children has a
political and constitutional history worth remembering. In a world in which
marriage is both a privileged status and a status of the privileged, marriage
equality that rests upon non-marriage’s ignominy risks reinforcing the many
other status inequalities that taint the legacy of marital supremacy.

14. For a critical perspective on the invocation of children in the marriage equality debate, see,
for example, Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573 (2005).
15. See Murray, supra note 7, at 419–23.
16. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
17. Id. at 2692. Justice Kennedy’s tribute to marriage evoked earlier gestures toward
marriage’s sacred and foundational status as a “basic civil right.” See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and
survival” (citations omitted)). Earlier, the Court declared marriage “the foundation of the family and
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.” Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190, 211 (1888).
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015).
19. Id.; see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (declaring that same-sex couples’ inability to
marry “humiliates tens of thousands of children,” making it “even more difficult for the children to
understand the integrity and closeness of their own famil[ies] and [their] concord with other families in
their communities and in their daily lives.”). For critiques of this aspect of Windsor, see, for example,
Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 243 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219
(2013); Widiss, supra note 7. For early critical commentary on Obergefell, see, for example, Serena
Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and the New
Marriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
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I.
“HAPLESS AND INNOCENT CHILDREN”: THE EARLY ILLEGITIMACY LITIGATION,
1966–1972
Illegitimacy penalties occupied a peculiar position in midcentury law and
public policy. Progressive reformers had long lamented the stigma and material
disadvantages imposed upon nonmarital children as cruel and anachronistic
relics. Indeed, reforms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ameliorated
many of the harshest legal disabilities that attached under the common law,
when a “bastard” was filius nullius—child of no one. 20 By the 1960s,
legislation in many states enabled some children to be legitimated by their
mothers’ subsequent marriage, to inherit from their mothers and maternal
relatives, and to make claims on their “natural fathers” for support. 21
Nevertheless, these reforms were uneven and incomplete: illegitimate children
often could not inherit from their biological fathers or paternal relatives,
receive government benefits to which legitimate children were entitled, sue for
their parents’ wrongful death or workers’ compensation, or effectively enforce
nonmarital fathers’ child support obligations. 22 State level legal reforms
proceeded in a lopsided fashion, shoring up the mother-child relationship but
leaving most nonmarital children with little claim to support or care from their
biological fathers. 23 Federal law, too, contained a bewildering patchwork of
statutory provisions, often relying on state law definitions and rules to
determine whether and when illegitimate children could receive various Social
Security and other benefits. 24
20. At common law, “bastards” had no right to support or inheritance from their parents or
other relatives and no right to adopt their biological fathers’ surnames. HARRY KRAUSE,
ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 5 (1971).
21. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA ch. 6 (1985); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE
LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED ch. 5 (2009).
22. As Harry Krause wrote in 1966, “Differences in the fifty state legal systems and, for
specific areas, federal law, are very pronounced and range from highly progressive to very traditional
approaches.” Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act
on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829, 830 (1966) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., CALEB FOOTE,
ROBERT J. LEVY & FRANK E.A. SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, ch. 1, § B
(1966) (describing the “status of children born out of wedlock circa 1965”); Marylin Klosty & Howard
J. Weiss, Editorial, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOK. L. REV. 45, 76–79 (1959) (chart comparing states’ various
approaches to property rights of illegitimate versus legitimate children).
23. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 22, at 854 (“[S]tatutes have provided in nearly all states that
in matters of inheritance the illegitimate occupies the same position with respect to his mother as a
legitimate child.”). However, as Jacobus tenBroek wrote in 1964, “Lightening the public burden for
support of the poor equally motivated the creation of both parents’ legal liability for their illegitimate
children.” Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
Present Status, Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 284 (1964).
24. See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337
(1962) (explaining that illegitimate children’s rights under federal law often depended upon state law,
and noting lack of clarity about which state rules should apply to the interpretation of a particular
federal provision). State laws defined legitimacy quite disparately, and some states made legitimating a
child more difficult than others. For instance, in some states, children could only be legitimated after
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At the same time, many citizens and policymakers viewed “illegitimacy”
as a more pressing social problem than ever. Rates of nonmarital childbearing
climbed among both young white women and poor women of color. Social
work professionals reframed white middle-class unwed pregnancy as a problem
of individual psychological maladjustment, but conventional wisdom held that
among nonwhite women, particularly African Americans, nonmarital
childbearing reflected deeper cultural disorder. 25 The 1965 Moynihan Report
reinforced the pervasive belief that “illegitimacy” and “matriarchy” contributed
to a “tangle of pathology” that fed poverty, crime, and juvenile delinquency in
black communities. 26
Race and illegitimacy had long been intertwined. 27 In the 1950s and
1960s, public discourse increasingly associated nonmarital childbearing with
rising public assistance costs and with unmarried African American mothers,
who had only recently gained access to many federal and state social welfare
programs. 28 Hard won civil rights victories inspired resistance in the form of
morals regulation; as historian Anders Walker has written, many efforts to
punish nonmarital childbirth were thinly veiled attacks on racial
desegregation. 29 During this period, proposals for punitive anti-illegitimacy

birth by the marriage of their biological parents; in other states, only fathers could legitimate (or
“acknowledge”) children (with or without the mother’s consent); in still other states, mothers could do
so unilaterally. To make matters more complicated, rules for establishing paternity also varied widely,
with many states imposing statutes of limitation on paternity actions. See generally id.
25. See generally REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED
MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890–1945 (1993); RICKIE SOLINGER,
WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1992). For
contemporaneous assessments of differences in the perception and treatment of white and nonwhite
unmarried mothers, see, for example, Ruth Chaskel, The Unmarried Mother: Is She Different?, CHILD
WELFARE, Feb. 1967, at 65; Justine Wise Polier, Problems Involving Family and Child, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 305, 308 (1966). For a contemporaneous statistical analysis of illegitimacy rates among various
demographic groups, see NATL. CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, PUB. NO. 75-1013, TRENDS IN ILLEGITIMACY: UNITED STATES 1940–1965 (1974).
26. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
On the gender and racial politics of the Moynihan Report, see, for example, Serena Mayeri,
Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93 B.U. L. Rev. 729 (2013).
27. See, e.g., PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009) (describing how anti-miscegenation laws effectively rendered
interracial sex and childbearing illicit and illegitimate); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus
Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134,
2158 (2014) (detailing how, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “restriction of fatherchild citizenship transmission outside the marital family regularly operated to exclude nonwhite
children from citizenship”); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 221 (1999) (exploring the use of private law doctrines and the law
of legitimacy to “reconcil[e] and preserv[e] both property rights and racial hierarchy”).
28. See, e.g., JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE
WAR ON POVERTY (1994).
29. See generally ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN
MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009); Anders Walker,
Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform
Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399 (1997). To give just one relevant example,
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laws—denial of public assistance, institutionalization of nonmarital children,
sterilization, and imprisonment—were widely understood as part of the
backlash against civil rights. 30 As journalist Fred P. Graham put it in 1968,
“‘Illegitimacy,’ like ‘crime in the streets,’ is becoming a substitute in many
minds for the ‘Negro problem.’” 31
Illegitimacy litigation did not proceed from a carefully planned,
incremental constitutional strategy. Cases cropped up organically, without the
handpicked plaintiffs favored by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) in
earlier campaigns against de jure racial segregation, and later, by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Women’s Rights Project
in pursuit of sex equality. But the LDF and the ACLU did enter the fray,
injecting broader concerns about race and poverty into their constitutional
challenges to illegitimacy-based classifications. For a time, the ascendancy of
civil rights and poverty law gave the young lawyers and scholars challenging
illegitimacy penalties ammunition for their constitutional attacks. Civil
libertarians and welfare rights lawyers also saw promise in the nascent
jurisprudence of sexual privacy. This Part traces the origins, brief life, and
premature demise of these arguments in early constitutional illegitimacy
litigation.
A. “Designed to Deprive a Single Class of Citizens”: Early Constitutional
Arguments
In 1960, Louisiana’s “suitable home” law, which withheld public
assistance from mothers who had given birth outside of marriage, sparked a
national outcry. The legislation, a direct response to racial desegregation
efforts, purged tens of thousands of impoverished African American families
from the state’s welfare rolls. 32 By this time, the success of constitutional

Mississippi abolished common law marriage in 1956 in an apparent attempt to bolster illegitimacy
rates among African American families so that black children could be denied access to white schools.
WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW, supra, at 41–43; see also FOOTE, LEVY & SANDERS, supra note
22, at 117 n.116 (describing 1964 Louisiana statute criminalizing the act of giving birth to an
“illegitimate” child, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:79.2 (Supp. 1964)); id. at 118 (noting that “such a
deterrent approach is not limited to the deep South”). For the most influential contemporaneous
analysis of the racial politics of welfare policy, see WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
(1965).
30. Such proposals were most common in, but not confined to, southern states. For press
coverage of sterilization proposals, see, for example, Sterilization Urged to Cut Illegitimacy, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 1959, at C8 (discussing proposed North Carolina bills); To Curb Illegitimacy, Sterilize
Unwed Mothers, States’ Lawmakers Urge, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1960, at D1 (discussing proposed
bills in Maryland and Virginia); Sterilization Urged to Cut Costs, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 1, 1961, at 1
(discussing Illinois bill); Bill to Curb Illegitimacy is Signed in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1964
(discussing enactment of Mississippi law authorizing imprisonment for up to ninety days as well as
fines for unwed parents who had a second illegitimate child).
31. Fred P. Graham, It’s Tough to Be Illegitimate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1968, at E10.
32. On the Louisiana crisis, see, for example, JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO
WORKFARE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945–1965, at 86–91 (2005);
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challenges to racial segregation provided the legal tools to question illegitimacy
penalties on equal protection grounds. On behalf of the ACLU, a young lawyer
named Melvin Wulf wrote a brief to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) attacking Louisiana’s policy. 33 Wulf stressed that Louisiana’s
suitable home law was racially motivated, “a punitive step to deter its Negro
citizens from pursuing their goal of equality.” 34 Even if the Louisiana policy
were not “designed to deprive a single class of citizens of rights to which they
are otherwise entitled,” as it clearly was, discriminatory intent could be inferred
from the policy’s severely disproportionate impact. 35
Wulf’s most novel argument came next: “We believe that any differential
treatment to which out-of-wedlock children are subjected is invidious and
likely unconstitutional.” 36 Just as Brown v. Board of Education held that “the
classification of Negroes qua Negroes was baseless,” the “differential treatment
accorded a class of citizens designated as ‘illegitimate’ is equally baseless.” 37
Need, not status, was the appropriate criterion by which to determine welfare
eligibility.
Notably, Wulf’s memorandum did not deny that illegitimacy penalties
might deter nonmarital sex and “promiscuity.” He wrote: “It may well be that if
out-of-wedlock children are deprived of minimum satisfaction of their physical
needs, thereby placing their lives in jeopardy, there will be a decrease in the
relationships leading to illegitimate births.” 38 But, he continued, “[I]t is clearly
unreasonable to attempt to improve a home’s moral climate by starving its
occupants to death.” 39
Wulf’s memo contained seeds of the constitutional arguments that
litigators would later raise in court, including the illegitimacy penalties’
racially discriminatory intent and effect; the idea that illegitimacy-based
see also Lisa Levenstein, From Innocent Children to Unwanted Migrants and Unwed Moms: Two
Chapters in the Public Discourse on Welfare in the United States, 1960–1961, J. WOMEN’S HIST.,
Winter 2000, at 10–33 (comparing the framing of Louisiana’s anti-welfare measures to those in
Newburgh, New York).
33. Wulf later described this as “the first memorandum on the unconstitutionality of
differential treatment of children born out of wedlock.” Letter from Melvin Wulf to Norman Dorsen,
(Nov. 20, 1967), collected in Norman Dorsen Papers, Tamiment Archive, Bobst Library, New York
University [hereinafter Dorsen Papers]; see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND
THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 84 (1993).
34. Memorandum from the ACLU on Louisiana Plan for Aid to Defendant Children, Filed
with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, at 2 (Nov. 22, 1960) [hereinafter ACLU
Memorandum to HEW], collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 11 (on file with the California
Law Review).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. The state, Wulf reasoned, had more effective means of protecting children from
immoral influences at its disposal: “If a home is in fact unsuitable because of a mother’s promiscuity,”
a court could order removal of the children. Id. The ACLU, Wulf declared, was “not in favor of sin,
but neither does it favor compounding sin with starvation.” Id.
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distinctions were invidious discrimination rather than justifiable privileging of
normative marital families; a reluctance to directly challenge the state interests
in deterring nonmarital childbearing and regulating sexual morality; and
skepticism about the state’s true motives, nurtured by the attenuated
relationship between the means employed by the state and the ends purportedly
sought.
Several years later, Illinois law professor Harry Krause established
himself as the leading legal authority on illegitimacy with a series of articles
culminating in an influential 1971 book. 40 Unlike many of the lawyers involved
in the early illegitimacy cases, Krause’s practice background was in tax and
international business transactions, not in civil rights and poverty law. 41 But
Krause quickly developed an academic portfolio in comparative family law and
policy. 42 In Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, published in 1967, Krause
framed the stakes as “a child’s right to a familial relationship with his father,”
which he argued was “more akin to a ‘fundamental right and liberty’ or a ‘basic
civil right of man’ than to a mere economic interest” entitled to a presumption
of constitutionality. 43 He depicted illegitimacy as a “second-class status,”
calling its impact “a psychic catastrophe.” 44 And, like Wulf, Krause compared
illegitimacy discrimination’s harm with that of racial segregation. Channeling
Brown’s concern with “badges of inferiority” inflicted upon children, he called
“the psychological effect of the stigma of bastardy . . . quite comparable to the
damaging psychological effects upon the victims of racial discrimination.” 45
Krause deliberately emphasized the child’s plight, rather than that of his
parents, and the paternal bond as the crucial loss suffered by nonmarital
children. The “psychic catastrophe” language would be cited again and again in
plaintiffs’ briefs challenging illegitimacy classifications, as would the analogy
between illegitimacy and race. And Krause cannily perceived that children’s
innocence could be “successfully exploited,” much like images of brave yet

40. KRAUSE, supra note 20. Krause’s articles published before the Supreme Court first
addressed the illegitimacy question include Krause, supra note 22; Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection
for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967); Harry D. Krause, Bastards Abroad—Foreign
Approaches to Illegitimacy, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 727 (1967). For other early applications of equal
protection analysis to illegitimacy classifications, see FOOTE, LEVY & SANDERS, supra note 22, at 72–
73 (1966); Note, “Suitable Home” Tests Under Social Security: A Functional Approach to Equal
Protection, 70 YALE L.J. 1192 (1961).
41. Born in Germany in 1932, Krause immigrated to the United States as a college student and
served in the U.S. Army before attending law school at the University of Michigan and working for
Covington & Burling. See Harry D. Krause, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 667 (1997).
42. Id.
43. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, supra note 40, at 488 (emphasis added).
44. Id. (quoting Nandor Fodor, Emotional Trauma Resulting from Illegitimate Birth, 54
ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHOL. 381, 381 (1945)).
45. Id.
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vulnerable children enduring hostile, hysterical mobs resisting school
integration spoke more eloquently than any legal brief ever could. 46
Child-focused arguments against illegitimacy penalties were nothing new.
Historian Michael Grossberg describes post-revolutionary illegitimacy law
reforms as “proceed[ing] from the conviction that parents’ sins should not be
visited on the innocent issue.” 47 Advocates for children, such as New York
reformer and Judge Justine Wise Polier, had attacked the stigma and legal
disabilities of illegitimacy in the 1940s and 1950s. 48 What was new about the
child-focused arguments of the 1960s was their context and their
constitutionalization. In the past, critics of illegitimacy penalties had invoked
morality, fairness, and an individual’s right not to be held responsible for the
conduct of others. Until the civil rights victories of midcentury, they had little
ammunition for arguments sounding in due process and equal protection.
Krause’s article debuted an equal protection argument that focused on the
relationship between legislative means and state objectives, rather than on
challenging the normative assumptions underlying illegitimacy laws. 49 Krause
was careful not to question all laws privileging marriage and traditional family
relationships—only those that punished children, who had no control over their
parents’ marital status.
Nor did Krause contest the government’s ability to regulate sexual
activity. “There is no question that the state may properly regulate many
aspects of sexual conduct. Our society holds that intercourse outside of
marriage is undesirable, and thus the discouragement of ‘illicit’ intercourse is
considered a proper end of legislation.” 50 But the connection between
illegitimacy penalties and the deterrence of nonmarital sex or unwed childbirth
was remote: fathers, he pointed out, were more likely to be deterred if held
responsible for the consequences of illicit sex. Mothers might be dissuaded by
the “shame of illegitimate pregnancy” but were more likely to turn to birth
control or abortion than to abstinence. 51 Krause did not question the validity of
the government interest in combating illegitimacy. Rather, he argued that the fit
between means and ends could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Krause applied the equal protection guarantee to illegitimacy-based
distinctions in child support, inheritance, the right to recover under wrongful

46. See id.; see also id. at 484 (“It is time that the matter be considered from the standpoint of
the child!”); KRAUSE, supra note 20, at 294–95 (expressing frustration that “[w]ell-intentioned people
have lavished disproportionate effort on the welfare mother”).
47. GROSSBERG, supra note 21, at 202.
48. See, e.g., Justine Wise Polier, Illegitimate!, WOMAN’S HOME COMPANION, Aug. 1947, at
32.
49. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, supra note 40, at 493 (“[I]f the state wishes
to discourage casual unions, it should do so directly, as, for example, by laws punishing fornication or
providing incentives for marriage.”).
50. Id. at 491–92.
51. Id. at 492 & n.62.
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death and workers’ compensation statutes, and eligibility for benefits accrued
through parental earnings and contributions, such as Social Security. 52 Each of
these discriminations would come under constitutional attack during the
following decade.
B. “Subject to Reexamination”: Levy and Glona
The first illegitimacy cases to reach the Supreme Court, Levy v.
Louisiana, 53 and Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance
Company, 54 foreshadowed both the promise and the perils of attacking
illegitimacy penalties under the Fourteenth Amendment. In court, advocates
emphasized the unfairness and irrationality of penalizing innocent children for
circumstances beyond their control, as well as the disparate impact of
illegitimacy penalties on poor African American families. The Court’s
decisions in Levy and Glona left ambiguous the scope of the illegitimacy cases’
challenge to marital supremacy and the racial and economic inequalities it
reproduced. The opinions rendered governing constitutional principles obscure,
and states’ prerogatives to punish parents for nonmarital childbearing remained
uncertain. Outside of court, though, civil libertarians raised questions about the
continuing viability of a regime that privileged formal marriage and curtailed
sexual liberty.
The Levy litigation began in 1964 when attorney Adolph Levy (no
relation to the plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit in Louisiana seeking damages on behalf
of Louise Levy’s five children for their mother’s wrongful death in a New
Orleans hospital. His complaint depicted Louise Levy as a model mother and
citizen: she worked hard, attended Catholic Mass regularly, and inculcated
moral values in her children. She did not depend on welfare, scraping together
money from her work as a domestic to send her children to parochial school.
Her attorneys argued that Louise Levy’s children should be compensated for
her death from hypertensive uremia, which occurred after a doctor failed to
detect and treat her condition, as if they had been legitimate. 55
Levy stressed that the children’s inability to recover for their mother’s
death would burden public coffers. “[T]he tortfeasor need reimburse no one.
The State must support the tragic victims.” 56 And he repeatedly proclaimed
nonmarital children’s innocence: “[T]he sins of the parents are being visited
upon the children who had absolutely nothing to do with their status.” 57 Levy
52. See generally KRAUSE, supra note 20.
53. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
54. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
55. Petition for Damages Due to Malpractice on Behalf of Levy (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. for Orleans
Dec. 16, 1964), reprinted in Appendix at 5, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508).
56. Petition for Writs of Certiorari and Review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, State of
Louisiana at 4, Levy v. State (La. 1967) (No. 48518), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 14.
57. Id. The petition continues: “[T]his case does not present to the Court the question of
whether parents who may be morally blameful may recover for the wrongful death of their child. It
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also made equal protection and due process arguments against the illegitimacy
exclusion’s constitutionality, but with relatively little doctrinal support. 58
Recognizing that his clients’ case would benefit from greater constitutional
expertise, Levy requested assistance from the ACLU. Norman Dorsen, a civil
liberties expert and New York University law professor, essentially took over
the case before the Supreme Court. Later that year, at the NAACP LDF’s
request, Dorsen and Levy asked Harry Krause to author an amicus brief on the
LDF’s behalf. 59
The LDF’s Leroy Clark requested that Krause “show the court that many
policies which on their face are designed to control ‘morals’ or which bear
heaviest on the poor, have a profound impact on the Negro community, which
has a high rate of illegitimacy and poverty.” 60 This argument about the impact
of facially race-neutral but purposefully discriminatory policies on African
Americans echoed claims the LDF made in school segregation, housing
discrimination, and voting rights cases. 61
The Louisiana statute, Krause’s LDF brief argued, “discriminates on the
basis of race.” 62 This “covert discrimination” had two sources:
“disproportionately more Negro children than white children are born out of
wedlock,” and, “even more important[ly] . . . a high percentage (70%) of white
illegitimate children are adopted . . . whereas very few (3–5%) Negro
illegitimates find adoptive parents.” 63 Together, these discrepancies meant that
“95.8 percent of all persons affected by discrimination against illegitimates
under the statute are Negroes. . . . [T]he classification of illegitimacy [here] . . .
is a euphemism for discrimination against Negroes.” 64 Race played a
prominent role in Dorsen’s brief as well, but as an analogue to illegitimacy,
rather than as an impetus for penalizing non-marriage. Dorsen and his

presents solely the question of whether children, morally blameless, may be prevented from
recovery . . . .” Id.
58. See, e.g., id. at 7–8.
59. See Letter from Norman Dorsen, N.Y.U. School of Law to Jack Greenberg, DirectorCounsel of NAACP LDF (Nov. 13, 1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 13; Letter from
Leroy Clark, NAACP LDF, to Norman Dorsen (Nov. 29, 1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32,
Folder 13; Letter from Norman Dorsen to Leroy Clark (Dec. 1, 1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box
32, Folder 13.
60. Letter from Leroy Clark, NAACP LDF, to Harry Krause, University of Illinois, School of
Law, (Dec. 4, 1967), at 1, collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 13.
61. Id. Racially disparate impact had also been a focus of Wulf’s brief against the Louisiana
suitable home law in 1960. See ACLU Memorandum to HEW, supra note 34.
62. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae at 18, Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112827.
63. Id. at 18–19.
64. Id. at 20.
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colleagues argued that classifications based on illegitimacy, like those based on
race, deserved strict scrutiny. 65
All of the briefs supporting the Levy children stressed that the central
injustice imposed by discrimination based on illegitimacy was the punishment
of children for their parents’ wrongful conduct. 66 Consulting attorney Lois
Sheinfeld wrote to Dorsen that courts were “showing an increasing awareness
and sensitivity to punishment of status or conditions of being.” 67 A recent
lower court case had “lovely language on penalizing needy children because of
the sexual activity of the mothers,” 68 and courts had recently invalidated laws
that punished the “status” of drug addict or vagrant, rather than unlawful
conduct. 69 Illegitimacy was “a status which is both involuntarily assumed and
cannot be voluntarily quitted.” 70 The Louisiana statute, the Levys’ final brief
contended, denied nonmarital children due process “on the basis of a condition
of birth and a status over which they had no control and are powerless to
correct.” 71
The State of Louisiana minced no words in defending the statute’s
exclusion of illegitimate children as necessary to preserve the institutions of
“marriage and the legitimate family.” 72 The State denied any intent to “punish[]
illegitimates” or even to “discriminat[e] against immorality in sexual
behavior.” 73 Rather, Louisiana sought only “positive” ends such as “the
encouragement of marriage” and “the preservation of the legitimate family as
the preferred environment for socializing the child.” 74 Defending the
community’s “withholding [of] prestige and honor” from illegitimate families,
Louisiana asserted: “If the community grants almost as much respect for nonmarriage as for marriage, illegitimacy increases.” 75 Moreover, “illegitimate

65. Brief for Appellants at 9, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508), 1967 WL 113865; see
also Brief for Executive Council of the Episcopal Church in the U.S.A. and the American Jewish
Congress as Amici Curiae at 25, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508), 1967 WL 129635.
66. See also Letter from David Rudovsky, Def. Ass’n of Phila., to Norman Dorsen (Dec. 4,
1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 13.
67. Letter from Lois P. Sheinfeld, N.Y.U. School of Law, to Norman Dorsen, regarding Levy:
Punishment of Status (Nov. 22, 1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 17.
68. Letter from Lois P. Sheinfield to Norman Dorsen, regarding Levy Comments (Dec. 5,
1967), at 1, collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 12. The case was Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp.
31 n.7 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff’d, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See Part I.C infra.
69. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that state law making
narcotic addiction a criminal offense violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment).
70. Letter from Sheinfeld to Dorsen, supra note 67.
71. Brief for Appellants, supra note 65, at 20; see also id. at 7 (“It is obvious that a child’s
illegitimacy is like his race and ancestry and has nothing whatever to do with his own actions or
conduct . . . .”).
72. Brief for the Attorney General, State of Louisiana at 3, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1967) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112828.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 7.
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daughters tend to err in the manner of their illegitimate mothers, producing
more illegitimate children.” 76
The Levy children’s allies followed Krause in belittling the notion that
denying illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of a
parent would effectively deter illicit sexual behavior and prevent nonmarital
childbearing. They did not, however, directly question the state interest in
promoting marriage and discouraging illicit sex. Dorsen’s protégée Sylvia
Law—then a third-year law student, later a leading feminist scholar and
advocate—summed up the strategy: “We have not questioned the value of
family (legitimate) system. We have shown that the discrimination here is
wholly ineffectual in deterring illegitimacy or securing legitimate families.” 77
Accused by Louisiana of attacking traditional marriage and family, the
Levys’ allies tried to strike a delicate balance in their characterization of Glona,
Levy’s mirror image. Minnie Brade Glona challenged her inability to recover
for the wrongful death of her illegitimate teenage son, Billy, who perished in a
car accident in Louisiana. Ms. Glona enjoyed nothing comparable to the Levy
children’s amicus support from several prominent civil rights organizations,
nor did she receive counsel from elite attorneys and scholars. Indeed, the
Levys’ attorneys were careful to distinguish Glona, which the Fifth Circuit had
decided unfavorably in a dismissive per curiam ruling. 78 “Denial of recovery to
the mother,” the Levys’ lawyers argued, “involves neither the problem of
economic dependence of child on mother that exists here nor the manifest
inequity of punishing individuals—the illegitimate children—for the acts of
others over whom they could have no control.” 79 Mothers, the brief implied,
were not comparably blameless.
The Court decided Levy and Glona in the claimants’ favor. Justice
William O. Douglas wrote short opinions in both cases that drew criticism for

76. Id. at 7.
77. Sylvia Law, Notes on Reply Brief to La. Attorney General (Feb. 22, 1968), collected in
Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 15 (emphasis added). Similarly, Chip Gray wrote in his own notes,
“Didn’t question social usefulness of family, but only relation of this discrimination to upholding it.”
Chip Gray, Note on Possible Reply Brief (Feb. 23, 1968), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder
15. Strikingly, the briefs supporting the Levys spent relatively little time discussing the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Loving v. Virginia, which had invalidated the remaining anti-miscegenation
statutes in June 1967, a few months before the Court noted probable jurisdiction in Levy. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Perhaps McLaughlin v. Florida, the 1964 decision overturning an extra
penalty for interracial cohabitation seemed more on point. See 379 U.S. 184 (1964). There, the Court
had not questioned the state’s ability to regulate nonmarital sex, just its differential policing of
unmarried interracial couples. See Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v.
Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1174–75 (2006).
78. See Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam),
rev’d, 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (“It cannot be said that the classification here by the Louisiana courts is
unreasonable.”).
79. Reply Brief for the Appellants at 3, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508) (1967), 1967
WL 113866.
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their enigmatic treatment of the constitutional issues at stake. 80 In Levy,
Douglas “start[ed] from the premise that illegitimate children are not
‘nonpersons.’ They are human, live, and have their being.” 81 He called the
classification that prevented Louise Levy’s children from recovering for her
wrongful death “invidious,” and asked, “When the child’s claim of damage for
loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms of ‘equal protection,’ should the
tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate? Why should the
illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of
wedlock?” 82
Douglas quoted more Shakespeare than precedent in Levy. 83 He did little
to clarify the standard of review for laws distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate children. Douglas did suggest that the “intimate familial
relationship between a child and his own mother” implicated a “basic civil
right” and concluded:
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the
wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though
illegitimate, were dependent upon her; she cared for them and nurtured
them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense;
in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent
would. 84
Douglas’s opinion in Glona was less florid but equally cryptic. 85 Glona,
Douglas wrote, differed from Levy, “where by mere accident of birth the
innocent, although illegitimate child was made a ‘nonperson’ by the
legislature.” 86 Douglas criticized Louisiana law for inconsistently penalizing
illegitimacy, and wrote that the exclusion of mothers from recovery had “no
possible rational basis . . . . It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that
women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages

80. See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 20, at 66 (“It is regrettable—and may mar the new law of
illegitimacy for some time to come—that the Supreme Court did not choose to document its epochal
decision more carefully.”); Kenneth L. Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1032 (1976)
(reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed.)) (calling
Levy “anything but a model of closely reasoned doctrinal exegesis”).
81. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
82. Id. at 71.
83. See id. at 72 n.6 (“We can say with Shakespeare: ‘Why bastard, wherefore base? When
my dimensions are as well compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As honest madam’s
issue? Why brand they us With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?’ King Lear, Act I, Scene
2.”). Early drafts of Douglas’s opinions followed Shakespeare (and the petitioner’s brief) in referring
at points to “bastards.” See Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Justice William O. Douglas, on
Levy and Glona (Apr. 18, 1968), collected in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter
Warren Papers], Box 551 (“I agree with both of your opinions . . . but I would feel a little more
comfortable if you referred to the children other than as ‘bastards.’”).
84. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71–72.
85. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
86. Id. at 75.
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for their death.” 87 This sentence questioning the rationality of the statute—the
relationship between means and ends—became perhaps the most oft-cited
aspect of Glona. But it also obscured the appropriate standard of review for
illegitimacy-based classifications, and prompted even sympathetic
commentators to accuse Douglas of using “brute force” to achieve the desired
result. 88
Douglas likely believed it would be difficult to marshal a majority to
declare illegitimacy classifications suspect. Justice Byron White at first
objected to Douglas’s reference to “basic civil rights.” 89 White apparently
overcame his misgivings and joined Douglas’s opinion, but Justices John
Marshall Harlan, Hugo Black, and Potter Stewart dissented from both Levy and
Glona in a combined opinion authored by Harlan. 90 To the dissenting Justices,
“everything the Court says about affection, nurture, and dependence” was
“irrelevant.” To impose a hierarchy of claimants on the basis of legal rather
than biological relationships was perfectly constitutional, especially in light of
the state’s unchallenged power “to provide that people who choose to live
together should go through the formalities of marriage.” 91
Justice Douglas’s opinions in Levy and Glona left ambiguous the
magnitude of the Court’s departure from traditional deference to states’ ability
to promote marriage and the legitimate family. 92 But the decisions inspired
hope among civil libertarians that the Court might look askance at laws that
distinguished between married and unmarried parents as well as their

87. Id. (echoing appellant’s brief); see also Bench Memorandum from CHW to Chief Justice
Earl Warren (Mar. 19, 1968), at 9–10, collected in Warren Papers, Box 313 (“In only one sense is this
a stronger case [than Levy] for the validity of the statute. If the challenged statute is to be justified as
discouraging illicit sexual relationships, then it is more rational to place the disability on the parents
rather than the child. However, that asserted justification is unpersuasive . . . .”).
88. Herbert Semmel, Social Security Benefits for Illegitimate Children after Levy v.
Louisiana, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 289, 290 (1970) (observing that the Court might instead “have framed the
question in terms of whether it is rational for a state to discourage illegitimacy by depriving the unwed
mother of a variety of benefits which the mother of a legitimate child receives”).
89. Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice William O. Douglas (May 9, 1968),
regarding Levy and Glona, collected in William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter
Douglas Papers], Box 1423, Folder 508.
I am inclined to join you in Levy and Glona but I wonder if in Levy you need to refer to “basic
civil rights.” You do not do this in Glona and still reverse the decision. That is the tougher
case and from it Levy is a fortiori without saying that it is a case to which we give special
scrutiny. Perhaps we have not really put speech, race and voting in a different category but at
least it seems that we have. I doubt that Levy belongs in this group but perhaps you disagree.
Id. White also drafted a concurrence, never filed, in which he characterized the challenged distinction
as “irrational and arbitrary.” See Draft Concurrence in Levy v. Louisiana (May 16, 1968), at 4,
collected in Byron R. White Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter White Papers], Box 126, Folder
13.
90. Dorsen had clerked for Harlan in the 1957 Term. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT 136 (1992).
91. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 73, 78, 80 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. For an argument that Levy and Glona are less progressive than is often recognized, see
Murray, supra note 7, at 390–99.
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children, 93 as John “Chip” Gray and David Rudovsky suggested hopefully in a
widely cited 1969 article. 94 The authors, recent law school graduates who had
worked with Dorsen on the case, contended that Douglas had effectively
applied strict scrutiny in Levy. 95 They interpreted Glona to mean that
discrimination against unmarried parents, too, should be constitutionally
suspect. Further, they contended, “even assuming that the state can
constitutionally regulate extramarital sexual activity, it should be required to
proceed with care in an area where both intimate human relationships and longstanding prejudices are involved.” 96
Unlike Krause and the Levy and Glona briefs, the out-of-court writings of
Dorsen, Gray, and Rudovsky did not assume an unfettered state prerogative to
regulate extramarital sexual activity. 97 They suggested, anticipating a Supreme
Court ruling still more than three decades in the future, 98 that “the ‘zone of
privacy’ in the area of sexual relationships in marriage,” recognized by the
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, “should include private sexual activity
between consenting adults.” 99
Strikingly, the authors also challenged the legal primacy of marriage. The
asserted state interest in “deter[ring] illegitimacy,” they wrote, boiled down to
an interest in “formal marriages as such.” 100 And “[t]he question whether
formal marriage promotes the interests traditionally associated with that
institution . . . certainly is subject to reexamination in light of developing
concepts of individual freedom and morality.” 101 The authors pointed out that
“[i]ncreasingly the right of government to prohibit or discourage ‘immoral’

93. Notably, Justice Douglas’s original draft of Levy did not leave this impression. In an early
version of the opinion he wrote, “If the constitutional question arose under an Act making father and
mother liable for producing illegitimate children, we would have a different problem. Here we are not
concerned with alleged ‘wrongdoers’ but with people born out of wedlock who were not responsible
for their conception or for their birth.” Someone wrote on the draft copy, “WOD: Isn’t this susceptible
of misconstruction? As contrary to Glona . . . ?” Another handwritten comment on the draft, also of
unclear provenance, summed up the reaction of many to Douglas’s opinion: “The result is correct. In
re the opinion: !!!” See William O. Douglas, First Circulated Draft of Levy Decision, at 1, collected in
Douglas Papers, Box 1423, Folder 508.
94. John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v.
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15–18
(1969).
95. Id. at 4–5. They also suggested, optimistically, that Levy might “be read to support the
emergence of preferred social and economic rights,” potentially including the “right to receive welfare
benefits” that anti-poverty lawyers were seeking in a contemporaneous litigation campaign. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
97. Norman Dorsen & David Rudovsky, Comment, Equality for the Illegitimate?, WELFARE
L. BULL., May 1967, at 15.
98. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
99. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 94, at 16; see also Dorsen & Rudovsky, supra note 97,
at 15.
100. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 94, at 16.
101. Id. at 17.
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conduct which damages no other public interest has been seriously
challenged.” 102
Of course, many (including Harry Krause, arguably the most prolific and
influential illegitimacy expert in the 1970s) continued to question the premise
of the civil libertarians’ out-of-court argument—that the “immoral conduct” of
illegitimacy damaged no other public interest. But as the next Section
describes, Dorsen, Gray, and Rudovksy were not alone. Plaintiffs and lawyers
in welfare rights cases seized on the promise of Griswold to articulate a much
more expansive vision of sexual privacy and autonomy than the Court’s
opinions recognized. 103
C. “I Told Her It Was None of Her Business”: King v. Smith
In King v. Smith, Mrs. Sylvester Smith challenged Alabama’s “substitute
father” regulation, which denied public assistance to mothers suspected of
having extramarital sexual relationships. 104 Such regulations were widely
understood to serve the dual purpose of punishing African Americans and
privatizing dependency by withholding public benefits from nonmarital
families. 105 King v. Smith was a centerpiece of the welfare rights movement’s
“Southern Strategy,” which targeted the most egregious policies enacted in the
Deep South, where the connection between morals regulation and resistance to
African American civil rights would be glaringly apparent. 106
Whereas the Levy children’s attorneys succeeded in portraying Louise
Levy as a model of maternal devotion, piety, and self-sufficiency, Smith
resisted pressures to conform to conventional notions of respectability.
Informed by her caseworker that her family of four children and one grandchild
would be ineligible for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) benefits if she did
not contradict rumors that she had an intimate relationship with Willie
Williams, a longtime family friend and a married father of nine children, Smith
flatly refused to confirm or deny the affair. “I told her it was none of her
business,” Smith recalled. 107 She also informed her (white) caseworker that she
had every intention of “going with” whomever she wished so long as she was
young enough to enjoy the company of men. 108 The Smith family could not
forgo even Alabama’s stingy ADC benefit lightly; three of Smith’s children

102. Id.
103. On the limitations of the Warren Court’s liberalism, see Justin Driver, The Constitutional
Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1101 (2012); see also MARC STEIN, SEXUAL
INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD TO ROE (2010).
104. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
105. See PLECK, supra note 2, at 47–70.
106. DAVIS, supra note 33, at 60.
107. Walter Goodman, The Case of Mrs. Sylvester Smith: A Victory for 400,000 Children, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1968, at 62 (quoting Mrs. Sylvester Smith).
108. Id. at 29.
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lived with their grandmother part-time while Smith worked daily eight-hour
shifts as a cook in Selma for sixteen to twenty dollars per week. 109
Smith’s declaration of sexual independence and insistence that her
personal life was nobody’s business did not translate perfectly into legal or
constitutional claims. But her arguments sounded in terms of sexual privacy
and the right not to have government benefits conditioned upon marriage or
celibacy. 110 Smith’s attorney, New York anti-poverty lawyer Martin Garbus,
argued that questioning a mother about her “most intimate relationships” and
requiring answers as a condition of receiving benefits “violates her right to
privacy,” infringing upon her freedom of association in a manner that was
“destructive of her personal relationships and [that] violate[d] her and her
children’s constitutional rights.” 111 Garbus did not concede Alabama’s “right to
regulate nonmarital relationships” and “prohibit immoral conduct”; rather, he
echoed the civil libertarians’ skepticism about such regulations’
constitutionality. 112
Garbus also made arguments similar to those presented in Levy. 113 There
was little question that the substitute father regulations had been enacted (as
opposed to merely implemented) as part of a political program targeted
specifically at curtailing African Americans’ right to receive public
assistance. 114 Alabama nevertheless denied any racial motivation and insisted
that the policy was designed not to prevent or punish sexual immorality, but
rather to exploit untapped resources and equalize the position of marital and
nonmarital households. Welfare department head Ruben King’s—and
segregationist Governor George Wallace’s—oft-quoted position was: “if a man
wants to play, then let him pay; and if he has the pleasures of a husband, then
he ought to have the responsibilities of a husband.” 115 Asked whether he
considered the regulation punitive, King answered in the negative. “[T]he

109. DAVIS, supra note 33, at 60; Rickie Solinger, The First Welfare Case: Money, Sex,
Marriage, and White Supremacy in Selma, 1966, A Reproductive Justice Analysis, 22 J. WOMEN’S
HIST., Fall 2010, at 13, 19; see also Joanne L. Goodwin, ‘Employable Mothers’ and ‘Suitable Work’:
A Re-Evaluation of Welfare and Wage-Earning for Women in the Twentieth-Century United States, J.
SOC. HIST., Winter 1995, at 266.
110. See Solinger, supra note 109, at 23–26.
111. Brief for Appellees at 8, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No. 949), 1968 WL 112516.
112. See id. at 70 n.57, 66 (relying, inter alia, on Griswold to argue that “Alabama’s substitute
father regulation unconstitutionally invades the privacy of mothers receiving ADC and imposes an
unconstitutional restriction on their lives and liberty”); see also DAVIS, supra note 33, at 65–66.
113. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 111, at 23 n.9 (citing the NAACP LDF’s brief in
Levy).
114. See DAVIS, supra note 33, at 56. Garbus characterized one of the primary motivations
behind the “substitute father rule” promulgated by Alabama’s welfare officials as “discourag[ing]
illegitimacy by penalizing Negro illegitimate children and their families by depriving them of aid.”
Brief for Appellees, supra note 111, at 23, 57 n.45; see also id. at 24–27 (detailing the dramatically
disproportionate impact on “Negro” families).
115. Appendix at 77, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (No. 949). On Wallace’s involvement in the
promulgation of the substitute father regulation, see PLECK, supra note 2, at 56.
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mother has a choice in this situation to give up her pleasures or to act like a
woman ought to act and continue to receive aid.” 116 What about the children?
asked Garbus. King had no answer.
Neither the federal district court nor the Supreme Court addressed
Garbus’s arguments about race and illegitimacy-based discrimination, denial of
due process, or sexual privacy and freedom of association. A three-judge panel
in the Middle District of Alabama acknowledged the evidence of racially
discriminatory purpose and effect in a footnote but did not base its equal
protection ruling on the racist origins or impact of the substitute father
regulation. 117 “The expressed interest of the State . . . in not desiring to
underwrite financially or approve situations which are generally considered
immoral is a laudable one,” said the court. 118 The judges found the law
“irrational” and “unreasonable,” because “[t]he punishment under the
regulation is against needy children, not against the participants in the conduct
condemned by the regulation.” 119
The Supreme Court adopted a similarly child-focused approach, but
avoided the constitutional questions. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for a
unanimous Court that Congress had “determined that immorality and
illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than
measures that punish dependent children, and that protection of such children is
the paramount goal of AFDC.” 120 In closing, Warren was careful “to
emphasize” that Alabama remained free to “discourag[e] illicit sexual behavior
and illegitimacy . . . by other means, subject to [unspecified] constitutional
limitations.” 121 Though a major victory for welfare rights advocates, 122 King v.
Smith was hardly a ringing endorsement of Mrs. Smith’s right to sexual and
economic autonomy.
Justice Douglas saw King v. Smith as not only a welfare case, but also an
illegitimacy case; not merely a question of statutory interpretation but also one
of constitutional law. 123 His concurrence found Alabama rule’s punishing
children for their mothers’ “sin” constitutionally infirm, and he placed “sin” in
quotation marks throughout his opinion. 124 Douglas believed Levy, decided less
than a month earlier, to be exactly on point. 125 The substitute father regulation
116. Appendix, supra note 115, at 103–04.
117. Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 37 n.7 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff’d, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
118. Id. at 39–40.
119. Id. at 38, 40.
120. King, 392 U.S. at 325.
121. Id. at 333–34.
122. As Karen Tani insightfully argues, King v. Smith was also a victory for HEW’s
interpretation of equal protection in the welfare context. See Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal
Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 825, 885–89 (2015).
123. King, 392 U.S. at 334 (Douglas, J. concurring).
124. Id. at 335–36.
125. Id. at 336.
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was “aimed at punishing mothers who have nonmarital sexual relations.” 126 In
a “comparable situation,” the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause
“barred discrimination against illegitimate children.” 127 Douglas reserved
judgment on “[w]hether the mother alone could be constitutionally cut off from
assistance because of her ‘sin.’” 128 He thought “the immorality of the mother
has no rational connection with the need of her children under any welfare
program.” 129 Douglas’s concurrence came closer than the majority opinion to
questioning whether punishing or deterring mothers’ sexual relationships was a
proper aim of government, but even he did not directly challenge this objective.
In the months after Levy, Glona, and King, several state courts struck
down statutory discriminations against illegitimate children, often using childfocused language. 130 Notably, though some commentators read the decision
expansively, 131 Glona, in contrast to Levy, was rarely parsed by courts in these
years, 132 except to cast doubt on the deterrent effect of illegitimacy-based
discrimination on nonmarital sex. 133 Courts also cited Glona to distinguish the
case as involving a presumptively genuine mother-child tie rather than a more
tenuous or difficult-to-prove father-child relationship. 134 Indeed, the fatherchild relationship went to the heart of the remaining legal distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children.
D. “Illicit and Beyond the Recognition of the Law”: Labine v. Vincent
By the early 1970s, many states had lightened or eliminated illegitimacy
penalties for nonmarital children in other fields, but inheritance law remained
the third rail of constitutional challenges. Even Dorsen and Rudovsky initially

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 335 n.4.
129. Id. at 336.
130. See, e.g., R. v. R., 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968) (“Under the guise of discouraging
illegitimacy, states may no longer cast the burden upon the innocent child.”); In re Jensen, 162
N.W.2d 861, 878 (N.D. 1968) (“This statute, which punishes innocent children for their parents’
transgressions, has no place in our system of government, which has as one of its basic tenets equal
protection for all.”).
131. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text; see also Aleta Wallach & Patricia Tenoso,
A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried Women and their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of
Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23, 45 (1974)
(“[Glona] can perhaps be understood as based upon some broader principle respecting the sanctity of a
woman’s right of free choice and privacy in matters of child bearing and association involved in the
formation of a family unit free from the imposition of coercive legal disabilities.”).
132. See Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 131, at 25 n.10 (“Glona became a footnote to Levy,
since they were viewed as synonymous rather than correlative.”).
133. See, e.g., Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1234–35 (D. Md. 1972), aff’d, 409
U.S. 1069 (1972) (“To paraphrase what the Supreme Court has said in Glona, this court can see no
possible rational basis for assuming that if an illegitimate child is allowed to recover Social Security
benefits the cause of illegitimacy will be served.”).
134. See, e.g., In re Hendrix, 326 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1971); Burnett v. Camden, 255 N.E.2d 650
(Ind. 1970).
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hesitated to endorse full equality in inheritance law for nonmarital children, 135
perhaps understanding that equality threatened ancient principles of AngloAmerican property law, raised thorny problems of proof, and caused otherwise
sympathetic judges to balk. Many opponents of illegitimacy penalties
eventually settled on the position that, to the extent fathers could reliably be
identified, nonmarital children should inherit on the same terms as marital
children—that is, fathers should not be conclusively presumed to intend that
only their legitimate children inherit. 136
It was not long before this very question reached the Supreme Court. In
1962, forty-two-year-old Lou Bertha Patterson gave birth to Rita Nell Vincent,
while living with Rita’s father, seventy-year-old Ezra Vincent, in rural
Louisiana. Vincent formally acknowledged Rita as his child, which obliged
him to support her, and he and Patterson raised Rita together until his death six
years later. Vincent left no will, no spouse, and no legitimate children. 137
Patterson had been married before and had, by 1971, married again and become
Lou Bertha Labine, but she never married Vincent. Under Louisiana’s intestate
succession law, an illegitimate child could only inherit if a decedent left no
ancestors or collateral relatives; 138 because two siblings survived Vincent, Rita
lost any claim to his estate. Labine appealed on her daughter’s behalf,
challenging the constitutionality of the succession hierarchy on equal
protection grounds.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal denied Labine’s appeal, distinguishing the
inheritance laws from wrongful death statutes both in their potential deterrent
effect on nonmarital childbearing and in their goal of preserving the stability of
land titles. 139 Whereas it might be difficult to foresee death by tort, “all men
must die and leave their property behind for their successors,” so “the denial of
inheritance rights to illegitimates might reasonably be viewed as encouraging
marriage and legitimation of children.” 140 The exclusion also served “the
prompt and effective determination of the valid ownership of property left by
decedents,” protecting estates from “unknown and not easily ascertained
claims.” 141 The Louisiana Supreme Court summarily affirmed. 142
The facts of Labine v. Vincent were sympathetic—Rita’s father had
formally acknowledged her, 143 so his paternity was undeniable. There were no

135. Dorsen & Rudovsky, supra note 97.
136. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 94, at 25–27.
137. Succession of Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 451 (La. Ct. App. 1969), aff’d & writ refused, 231
So.2d 395 (La. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
138. Id. at 450 n.1.
139. Id. at 450.
140. Id. at 452.
141. Id.
142. Succession of Vincent, 231 So.2d 395 (La. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).
143. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 532 (1971).
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wife and legitimate children whose “family unity” would be disrupted by a
nonmarital child’s inheritance. Had Rita been legitimate, “she would have
inherited Ezra Vincent’s entire estate since she was his only child.” 144
Moreover, Vincent’s brother and sister had difficulty proving their relationship
to the deceased. 145 Further, the Louisiana courts had also denied Rita
“alimony” from Vincent’s estate, apparently because she was already receiving
federal social security survivors’ benefits. 146 Making the most of these facts,
Labine’s attorney, James J. Cox, opened his brief to the U.S. Supreme Court by
characterizing his client as “a destitute Negro child . . . who was born out of
wedlock.” 147
As an amicus in Labine, the ACLU raised many of the same arguments
presented by the briefs in Levy. The ACLU’s Labine brief, authored primarily
by Krause in consultation with Dorsen and Wulf, argued that illegitimacybased classifications had a disproportionate impact on African Americans and
should be suspect based on an analogy to (and overlap with) racial
classifications. 148 With new ammunition from Justice Douglas’s opinion in
Glona, the brief also called into question the deterrent effect on illicit sex of
disinheriting nonmarital children. 149
There were subtle differences from Levy as well. In the interim, the Court
had decided Dandridge v. Williams, a challenge to Maryland’s cap on the total
amount of AFDC benefits a family could receive, regardless of family size. 150
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that such restrictions violated equal
protection in part because of their disparate impact on large, impoverished
families. 151 Dandridge dashed advocates’ hopes that the Court would recognize
poverty as a suspect classification, and language about discrimination against
or disparate impact on the poor receded from the illegitimacy cases. 152 On the
other hand, Labine, unlike Levy and Glona, presented an opportunity for
Krause to bolster the father-child relationship he considered most crucial.
Another significant difference from Levy and Glona: the Court’s
composition. In 1968, Chief Justice Earl Warren retired. President Richard
Nixon’s replacement, Warren Burger, initiated a rightward shift that was still
incomplete when the Justices heard arguments in Labine in January 1971. By
then, Harry A. Blackmun, a childhood friend and putative protégé of Burger’s

144.
136223.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
133.

Brief for Appellant at 4, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (No. 70-5257), 1970 WL
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae at 3–6, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (No. 70-5257).
Id. at 7.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
See id. at 475, 484; DAVIS, supra note 33, at 129–30.
For more on anti-poverty lawyers’ reaction to Dandridge, see DAVIS, supra note 33, at
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had joined the Court, replacing the more liberal Abe Fortas. Burger seemed
likely to join the Levy and Glona dissenters (Harlan, Black, and Stewart) in
upholding the Louisiana inheritance law, while the four remaining members of
the Levy/Glona majority (Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall) inclined
toward invalidation. 153 In Labine, therefore, the newly minted Justice
Blackmun would cast a decisive vote.
Blackmun’s initial instinct was to sympathize with Rita Nell Vincent.
“The case is a rather good one factually,” he reflected. 154 Paternity was not in
question, and the competing relatives were neither ancestors nor descendants of
the decedent. Rita, Blackmun reflected, “is just as much a child of the decedent
as a legitimate child would be and it is unfair to penalize her for her illegitimate
status. Illegitimacy is not her fault.” 155 On the other hand, laws “which g[a]ve
priority to legitimacy encourage[d] marriage and family status,” and avoided
problems of proof in closer cases. Levy and Glona, though “not exactly the
same” as Labine, “afford[ed] a precedent,” Blackmun wrote. 156 All in all,
Blackmun’s “general leaning” was “in favor of the acknowledged child.” 157 He
worried, however, about the “logical difficulty in drawing the line at that
point.” 158 It seemed to him that “any theory which favors an acknowledged
child . . . has to go all the way and . . . favor any illegitimate child.” 159 This
brought Blackmun back to his concern about “spurious claims” and the
“difficult aspect of proving paternity.” 160
Blackmun’s clerk, Daniel B. Edelman, did not share his ambivalence. It
was clear to Edelman, who later became a noted civil rights attorney, that
Louisiana’s inheritance law should be unconstitutional under Levy. Edelman
found Justice Black’s draft majority opinion “disturbing and unsatisfying to say
the least,” and he wrote passionate memoranda excoriating Black’s
circulations. 161 Stewart’s clerk Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. was nearly as scathing in
his denunciation of Black’s opinion. 162

153. White was probably the least reliable vote in this group, given his misgivings about the
reasoning in Levy and his generally more conservative approach, though his civil rights record placed
him firmly in the liberal camp in those cases.
154. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to file, regarding Labine, at 1, collected in
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter Blackmun Papers], Box 131, Folder 8.
155. Id. at 1–2.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Letter from Daniel B. Edelman, Clerk to Justice Blackmun, to Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
regarding Labine v. Vincent Black Recirculation (Feb. 10, 1971), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box
131, Folder 8.
162. “[I]f there’s any tenable reason for the decision in the opinion I can’t find it,” he wrote to
the Justice. Letter from Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Clerk to Justice Potter Stewart, to Justice Potter Stewart,
regarding Labine v. Vincent, at 1, collected in Potter Stewart Papers, Manuscripts and Archives,
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Despite their clerks’ entreaties, Blackmun and Stewart joined Black’s
abrupt retreat from Levy and Glona. Stewart had dissented in the earlier cases,
and Blackmun’s vote with the majority in Labine surprised few; before
Blackmun’s authorship of Roe v. Wade and his drift to the left in subsequent
years, he and Burger were often dubbed the (conservative) “Minnesota twins.”
Indeed Blackmun’s first opinion for the Court upheld “midnight raids” on the
homes of welfare recipients. 163
Opponents of illegitimacy penalties had compared them to racial
classifications in a bid for strict judicial scrutiny; Justice Black’s opinion for a
five-to-four majority in Labine instead analogized illegitimate children to
“concubines.” 164
The social difference between a wife and a concubine is analogous to
the difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate child. One set
of relationships is socially sanctioned, legally recognized, and gives
rise to various rights and duties. The other set of relationships is illicit
and beyond the recognition of the law. 165
The State could, therefore, “assert its power to protect the wife and children
against the claims of a concubine and her children,” Black wrote. 166 Black’s
opinion bolstered, in no uncertain terms, the State’s prerogative to privilege
marriage and to denigrate nonmarital relationships.
In dissent, Justice William Brennan’s indignation was palpable—and
child-centered. His opening paragraph accused the majority of “uphold[ing] the
untenable and discredited moral prejudice of bygone centuries which
vindictively punished not only the illegitimates’ parents, but also the hapless,
and innocent, children.” 167 States could incentivize marriage “far more directly
by focusing on the parents whose actions the State seeks to influence.” 168 As
much as he abhorred Black’s cavalier dismissal of discrimination, Brennan’s
dissent reinforced the distinction between culpable unmarried parents on the
one hand, and their blameless children on the other. 169

Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University [hereinafter Stewart Papers], Box 247, Folder 2885. Rowe
importuned Stewart to at least write a separate concurrence to no avail. Id.
163. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE
BLACKMUN 61–62 (2005).
164. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
165. Id. Justice Brennan’s “Case History” of Labine noted that the language “illicit and beyond
the recognition of the law” was a late addition to Justice Black’s majority opinion. Case History,
Labine v. Vincent, at xiv–xv, collected in William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Library of Congress, Box
II:6, Folder 8.
166. Labine, 401 U.S. at 538.
167. Id. at 541 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 558.
169. “[T]he formality of marriage,” he wrote, “primarily signifies a relationship between
husband and wife, not between parent and child.” Id. at 552–53. He also approvingly quoted a North
Dakota decision invalidating a similar law “punish[ing] innocent children for their parents’
transgressions.” Id. at 558–59.
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E. “No Child Is Responsible for His Birth”: Weber v. Aetna Casualty
Labine horrified opponents of illegitimacy penalties. 170 Many liberals
worried that the departures of Justices Black and Harlan over the next several
months would allow Nixon to scuttle hard-won gains in civil rights and civil
liberties. By the time the Court heard its next illegitimacy case, Weber v. Aetna
Casualty, Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a conservative Democrat and racial
moderate from Virginia, and William H. Rehnquist, a conservative Republican,
had joined the Court.
Like Levy, Glona, and Labine, the Weber case originated in Louisiana and
involved an African American family. Willie Mae Weber had lived with Henry
Clyde Stokes for three years, often caring for his four legitimate children while
he was on the road as a truck driver and bearing two of Stokes’s children, one
posthumously. 171 Weber described herself as his “common law wife,” 172
although Stokes remained married to the mother of his children, and Louisiana
did not recognize common law marriage in any event. 173 Stokes and Weber
apparently did not marry because Stokes’s wife was mentally ill and often
hospitalized, 174 presumably making divorce difficult. When Stokes died in a
job-related accident, his legitimate children reached a settlement with the
insurance company that left nothing for his illegitimate children. 175 Willie Mae
Weber appealed on behalf of her children, Letha Marie and Joseph, challenging
the exclusion of illegitimate children from the statutory definition of “child.” 176
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied her claims. 177
The arguments presented to the Court in Weber represented a departure
from prior illegitimacy cases. Ironically, race virtually disappeared from the
first illegitimacy case argued by an African American attorney, and not by his
choice. Vanue Lacour, one of only a handful of black lawyers practicing in
Louisiana, had experience litigating civil rights cases and would go on to a
distinguished career as a professor at a historically black law school in Baton

170. See, e.g., Letter from Norman Dorsen to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (April 26, 1971),
collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 29, Folder 16 (expressing “disappointment” at the Labine decision
and complimenting Justice Brennan for a “powerful” dissent).
171. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972); see also State ex rel. Stokes v.
Stokes, 222 So. 2d 573 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Answer of Willie Mae Weber, Stokes v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., No. 129,119 (La. 19th Judicial Dist. Ct. E. Baton Rouge Parish Mar. 16, 1968), reprinted in
Appendix at 20–21, Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (No. 70-5112).
172. See Answer of Willie Mae Weber, supra note 171.
173. On the disparate impact on poor women and women of color of failing to recognize
common law marriage, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996).
174. Weber, 406 U.S. at 165.
175. Id. at 166–68 (explaining that under Louisiana law, unacknowledged illegitimate children
could only recover if legitimate children did not exhaust available funds).
176. Id.
177. Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 So.2d 567 (La. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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Rouge. 178 When Lacour wrote to the ACLU to ask for amicus assistance, he
specifically requested an “emphasis on the fact that the practical effect of the
law excluding illegitimates from enjoying an equal right to workmen’s
compensation is to discriminate against black people.” 179
The ACLU filed an amicus brief, but apparently rejected Lacour’s
suggested angle. 180 Rather than detailing the disparate impact of illegitimacy
penalties on African Americans or arguing illegitimacy was a suspect
classification, as they had in past cases, the claimants emphasized the
continuing vitality of Levy after Labine, and argued that workers’
compensation benefits were more similar to wrongful death recovery than to
inheritance. 181 As a result, neither of the Justices who wrote in Weber had been
exposed to the race- (and poverty-) based arguments that their more senior
colleagues had heard in Levy, Glona, and Labine. 182
The Weber strategy worked: at Conference, six of the nine Justices voted
to reverse, with Burger and Blackmun tentatively on board. 183 Burger, who had
expressed skepticism about Lacour’s position at oral argument, may have voted
with the majority so that he, rather than Douglas, could assign the opinion. 184
Powell would write one of his first opinions for the Court in Weber, over a
dissent from Rehnquist. 185
Powell assigned the case to clerk J. Harvie Wilkinson III, the son of close
family friends who had welcomed the Powells into their Richmond home for
many Sunday dinners. 186 Wilkinson’s initial draft drew praise from Powell,
who wrote, “Your draft opinion . . . is very good indeed, and I think very little

178. See Russell L. Jones, African American Legal Pioneers: A Biography of Vanue B. Lacour
“A Social Engineer,” 23 S.U. L. REV. 63 (1995).
179. Letter from Vanue Lacour to Mel Wulf, Legal Dir. of ACLU (Nov. 16, 1971), collected in
Dorsen Papers, Box 35, Folder 12.
180. See Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Weber, 406 U.S. 164 (No. 70-5112).
181. Id.
182. It is quite possible, even probable, that Powell would not have discussed the racial impact
of illegitimacy classifications anyway, but the absence of such arguments from the briefs likely
ensured their absence from the opinion.
183. See Conference Notes, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Feb. 18, 1972), collected
in Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington and Lee School of Law [hereinafter
Powell Papers].
184. It seems likely that Douglas would have assigned the opinion to himself.
185. See Conference Notes, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra note 183 (noting
Burger’s “tentative” vote at conference to reverse).
186. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. — A Personal View, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3, 3–4 (2008). On Powell’s friendship with Wilkinson’s father, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., see
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2001) (passim). Powell
was sworn in on January 7, 1972; the Court heard oral arguments in Weber on February 28. See Joan
Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, A1;
see also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 92 S. Ct. 1400, 1400 (1972).
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revision is required.” 187 Powell’s only real criticism concerned Wilkinson’s
final paragraph, where the clerk began:
Our legal experiment with illegitimacy has always risked being an
ineffectual attempt to punish the parent by stigmatizing the child. It
has refuted the notion that legal burdens in our society bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing and that no
man under our system of law be unduly victimized by the fortuitious
conditions and circumstances of his birth. Though it may not always
void them, the Fourteenth Amendment peers most searchingly at
statutory classifications and statuses over which individuals have slight
or no control. 188
Here, Wilkinson cited several cases involving race discrimination,
including Brown v. Board of Education and Hirabayashi v. United States. 189
He continued:
No child controls his illegitimacy. What social opprobrium these
hapless children may suffer we are powerless to prevent, but the most
senseless of their legal burdens the Equal Protection Clause compels
us to eliminate. We can see most poignantly the fallacy of
discriminating between classes of offspring where, as in the case
before us, the deprivation was so equally shared; where, as here, the
legitimate and the illegitimate are alike without a father. 190
Powell gently urged Wilkinson to tone down this language. He wrote,
Your last page or two—while beautifully written—may sound a little
more like a social studies lecture than a judicial decision. I like what
you have written and hesitate to modify or omit much of it, but let’s
take a look at it—asking the question whether, in the US Reports, it
will seem a little overzealous in the social implications? 191
In the end, Powell’s Weber opinion closely resembled Wilkinson’s draft.
Finding Levy to be the “applicable precedent,” 192 the decision—unanimous
except for Rehnquist—resoundingly reinforced the child-focused critique of
illegitimacy penalties. Powell and Wilkinson intentionally left the standard of
review ambiguous, writing that the “essential inquiry” in equal protection cases
involved examining what “legitimate state interest” the “classification
promote[d]” and asking “[w]hat fundamental personal rights” it “might . . .

187. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Mr. Wilkinson, No. 70-5112, Weber v. Aetna (Mar.
13, 1972), at 1, collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file.
188. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, First Draft of Weber v. Aetna Opinion (March 10, 1972), at 14,
collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file.
189. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S 81
(1943).
190. Wilkinson, First Draft of Weber v. Aetna Opinion, supra note 188, at 14–15.
191. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Mr. Wilkinson, No. 70-5112, Weber v. Aetna (Mar.
13, 1972), at 2, collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file.
192. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
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endanger.” 193 The opinion affirmed that “the regulation and protection of the
family unit have indeed been a venerable state concern.” 194 The Court did “not
question the importance of that interest” but rather “how the challenged statute
will promote it” 195—that is, the relationship between means and ends. Quoting
Glona, Powell rejected the notion that “persons will shun illicit relations
because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen’s
compensation.” 196
Powell’s closing paragraphs retained much of the substance of
Wilkinson’s “social studies lecture,” albeit stated somewhat more concisely
and with fewer rhetorical flourishes. Weber’s final paragraph would be quoted
again and again in future illegitimacy cases:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and
unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as unjust—way of
deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social
opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal
Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws
relating to status of birth where—as in this case—the classification is
justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise. 197
Weber thus solidified the child-focused account of illegitimacy’s harm:
nonmarital relationships remained “irresponsible,” but “hapless children”
should be protected from their most oppressive legal consequences. 198

193. Id. at 173.
194. Id. Wilkinson’s first draft called this a “sacred and venerable state concern.” Wilkinson,
First Draft of Weber v. Aetna Opinion, supra note 188, at 11.
195. Weber, 403 U.S. at 173.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 175–76.
198. Id. at 174, 176. Rehnquist’s dissent did not attract the votes of any of his colleagues, not
even Stewart, the only surviving dissenter from Levy and Glona. Id. at 177. It did succeed in
provoking Wilkinson’s ire. Rehnquist accused the majority of infidelity to its recent decision in
Dandridge to uphold Maryland’s cap on welfare benefits for large families against an equal protection
challenge. Id. at 184. Wilkinson fumed that Rehnquist “should hardly be so pious about precedent”
given that his dissent “by implication . . . casts a major shadow over most of this Court’s equal
protection work in the last decade and a half.” Memorandum from J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, to Justice
Powell, Weber (Apr. 14, 1972), at 2, collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file. Wilkinson
drafted a footnote for Powell, which would have replied to Rehnquist’s criticism but in so doing,
strongly implied that something more than rational basis review applied to illegitimacy-based
classifications. See id. In the interest of “leav[ing] [Powell] flexible and uncommitted” on the
appropriate standard of review, and recognizing disagreement among the majority Justices about the
proper level of scrutiny, Wilkinson ultimately recommended that Powell let Rehnquist’s critique go
unanswered. See id.
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Weber’s focus on the injustice visited upon innocent children may have
been over-determined, but it was not inevitable. Child-focused arguments
dominated the ACLU’s brief in Weber to an unprecedented extent. 199 True, the
briefs in illegitimacy cases from Levy on barely mentioned the impact of
illegitimacy penalties on the parents of nonmarital children, other than to cast
aspersions on the power of these laws to deter nonmarital sex. But Douglas’s
Glona opinion had left the door open to parents’ claims. Some commentaries,
including the widely cited Gray and Rudovsky article, suggested more
capacious interpretations of Glona and Levy that encompassed the rights of
adults as well as children and emphasized the illegitimacy cases’ potential to
expand the doctrine of sexual privacy. 200
Further, the Court was beginning to reconsider the rights of unmarried
couples and parents in the early 1970s. Just a few weeks before Weber (but
without Powell or Rehnquist’s participation), the Court validated Peter
Stanley’s challenge to an Illinois policy denying fathers custody of their
nonmarital children without so much as a hearing. 201 In Stanley, Justice White
quoted Levy and Glona as he declared that the law had not “refused to
recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony,”
and that “natural, but illegitimate, children . . . cannot be denied the right of
other children because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm,
enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organized
family unit.” 202 Many hoped (or feared) that Stanley portended a new era for
nonmarital parenthood. Eisenstadt v. Baird, too, seemed to bode well for the
rights of the unmarried, as the Court extended constitutional protections for
contraceptive use beyond the “sacred precincts of the marital bedroom” 203 to
include “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether or not to bear or beget a child.” 204

199. Nor did the briefs for Weber press the point that illegitimacy-based classifications should
be suspect and subject to strict scrutiny, although advocates would pick up and promote this argument
again in future cases. It seems likely that Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall would have endorsed this
position. White might have been a tougher sell, given his misgivings about the “basic civil rights”
language in Levy—but he did join the Frontiero plurality to make sex suspect. Burger, Stewart, and
Rehnquist would almost certainly not have embraced this position, and it seems highly unlikely that
Blackmun would have, given his vote with the majority in Labine.
200. See supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text (discussing Gray & Rudovsky, supra note
94); Dorsen & Rudovsky, supra note 97; see also Semmel, supra note 88, at 300–01 (suggesting that
Glona might call into question the exclusion of unmarried mothers from Social Security “mother’s
insurance” benefits).
201. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
202. Id. at 651–52.
203. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
204. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The “sacred precincts of the marital
bedroom” invoked by Douglas in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479, gave way to Justice Brennan’s
declaration that “the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but
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Despite these promising contemporaneous developments, Powell’s
account in Weber of the harm of illegitimacy classifications had enormous
staying power: every pro-plaintiff illegitimacy decision thereafter quoted
liberally from the opinion’s lament for “hapless” children. 205 This focus on
children and on means-ends rationality eclipsed the expansive visions of sexual
privacy and autonomy offered by civil libertarians and welfare rights advocates
in cases such as King v. Smith and in out-of-court writings questioning marital
supremacy itself.
The Court’s failure to discuss race in the early illegitimacy cases may
have been a blessing in disguise: if the Court had relied on racially
discriminatory impact or motive to invalidate illegitimacy-based classifications,
its rulings might have been interpreted to require such discriminatory intent or
effect in order to warrant constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, some commentators
speculated that the unmentioned racial and socioeconomic subtext served to
deepen the Justices’ sympathy for plaintiffs in these early cases. 206 Further, a
recognition of illegitimacy penalties’ disparate impact on people of color and
the poor would have been compatible with a child-focused rationale that did
not extend meaningful protection to unmarried adults or parents.
But the Court’s failure to adopt advocates’ arguments about sexual
privacy and autonomy, the harms illegitimacy penalties visited on parents as
well as children, and the constitutionally questionable government interest in
privileging formal marriage and traditional family structure had far reaching
detrimental consequences. Advocates’ accounts of the constitutional harm of
illegitimacy penalties posed a more profound challenge to the race and classinflected structural inequalities marital supremacy sustained. And as the next
Part demonstrates, once arguments about illegitimacy penalties’ reinforcement
of class- and race-based oppression fused with the feminist imperative to
challenge women’s subordination, the impact of illegitimacy penalties on
adults and the true costs of marital supremacy were thrown into stark relief.
II.
“AN INDEPENDENT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ABOLITION OF ILLEGITIMACY”:
THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINIST ARGUMENTS, 1972–1979
Seen from the perspective of Willie Mae Weber or Lou Bertha Labine, the
illegitimacy cases were about more than a denial of rights to hapless and
an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.” Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 453.
205. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973) (per curiam); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769–70 (1977).
206. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV.
255, 260 (1973) (“Lines drawn on the basis of legitimacy could be viewed as a sophisticated form of
racial discrimination. The Court could have felt that it realistically extended the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in striking them down.”).
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innocent children. Rita Vincent’s inability to inherit from her father and the
Weber children’s lack of access to Henry Stokes’s workers’ compensation
benefits left their mothers on their own to fend for themselves and their
children. Whether or not limiting sources of support for nonmarital children
effectively deterred illicit sexual relationships—the focus of inquiry in the early
illegitimacy cases—denials of benefits or inheritance on the basis of
illegitimacy burdened their mothers at least as much as the children themselves.
By the early 1970s, with new constitutional weapons in hand, some
feminists and anti-poverty lawyers challenged the child-centered focus of
illegitimacy litigation. The unfairness of holding mothers solely responsible for
their illegitimate children’s support had troubled feminists of earlier eras. 207
But it was not until the late 1960s that courts began seriously to question the
constitutionality of laws that treated women and men differently. In Reed v.
Reed (1971), the Supreme Court ruled an Idaho statute preferring male estate
administrators unconstitutional; 208 eighteen months later, in Frontiero v.
Richardson (1973), the Court struck down a provision requiring military
servicewomen to prove their husbands’ dependence in order to receive spousal
housing and medical benefits automatically available to servicemen and their
wives. 209 And in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975), Ruth Bader Ginsburg
successfully argued that denying Social Security “mothers’ insurance” benefits
to widowed fathers unconstitutionally devalued their wives’ earnings. 210
Around the same time, feminists began to reframe illegitimacy penalties
as injurious to women as well as to children. 211 Like the earlier sexual
libertarian arguments, the broadest feminist critiques of illegitimacy penalties
emerged outside the courtroom. In the early 1970s, for instance, Aleta Wallach
and Patricia Tenoso attacked the dominant child-focused campaign against
illegitimacy laws head-on. 212 The “legal literature,” they wrote in 1974, was
“replete with expressions of concern for the ‘innocent’ child,” ignoring the
impact of illegitimacy penalties on women and on “the family unit as a

207. See, e.g., Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of
Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1694–97 (2000) (describing how
feminists in the 1920s and 1930s understood “that unmarried women’s practical right to transmit
citizenship to foreign-born children was predicated upon their legal responsibility to assume full
financial and caregiving duties” and “argued that this sex-based policy disadvantaged American
women relative to American men by perpetuating the sex-based allocation of parental duties”).
208. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
209. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
210. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
211. This effort was not confined to the United States. See, e.g., U.N. Commission on the Status
of Women, The Status of the Unmarried Mother: Law and Practice: Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.6/540/Rev.1 (1971).
212. See Patricia Tenoso & Aleta Wallach, Book Review, 19 UCLA L. REV. 845 (1972)
(reviewing KRAUSE, supra note 20); Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 131. For examples of Krause’s
efforts to shift attention from mothers’ rights to the child-father relationship, see, for example, Harry
D. Krause, The Bastard Finds His Father, 3 FAM. L.Q. 100, 106 (1969).
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whole.” 213 This approach ignored “an independent justification for abolition of
illegitimacy: the right of women to self-determination requires that they be free
from all forms of male domination.” 214 Wallach and Tenoso sought to unsettle
the patriarchal nuclear family ideal and empower women as independent
economic, social, and sexual actors untethered to men.
Feminists like Wallach and Tenoso criticized anti-illegitimacy campaigns
that took for granted the inherent undesirability of nonmarital childbearing.
“Illegitimacy,” they argued, was a “problem” primarily because law and social
norms made it so. 215 Patriarchy and poverty were the true culprits. On this
view, Harry Krause’s proposed Uniform Legitimacy Act “merely substitute[d]
paternity for marriage as the basis for classifying children.” 216 Krause’s
relentless focus on ascertaining paternity reflected his “implicit assumption that
only the male can or should support a family.” 217 As a result, Krause failed to
“treat the mother as an economic resource” by “eliminat[ing] the barriers to her
employment.” 218 Nor did he consider alternatives to paternal support—namely
“adequate governmental support of all unmarried mothers and their
children.” 219 For these feminists, privileging marriage and privatizing
dependency through paternity impaired women’s sexual and economic
autonomy and ensured women’s subordination to men in both the private realm
of family and the public world of the market and political life. 220
Hardly a trace of this full-throated feminist attack on marital supremacy,
sex inequality, and sexual repression appeared in the dozen-odd illegitimacy
opinions issued by the Supreme Court in the 1970s. Yet in many of these cases,
advocates did translate some of the feminist critique into constitutional
arguments. These challenges never coalesced into a grand strategy of the sort
that propelled racial desegregation campaigns, and, to a lesser extent,
Ginsburg’s sex equality litigation. Still, feminist-inflected arguments were
213. Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 131, at 25 (“Because of the caretaker-dependent
relationship between mother and child, . . . the child’s status is inextricably bound to that of its
mother.”).
214. Id. By “coercing women into marriage, [illegitimacy] submerges their identities and limits
their freedom.” Id. at 28.
215. Id. at 30.
216. Tenoso & Wallach, Book Review, supra note 212, at 865. Krause’s Uniform Legitimacy
Act proposal, described in his 1971 book, became a basis for the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), for
which Krause served as the draftsman-reporter. See Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act,
FAM. L.Q., Spring 1974, at 1–25.
217. Tenoso & Wallach, Book Review, supra note 212, at 850.
218. Id.
219. Id. For contemporaneous treatments of feminism and illegitimacy, see, for example,
Herma Hill Kay’s discussion of “Illegitimacy and the Social Status of Women,” in KENNETH M.
DAVIDSON, RUTH B. GINSBURG & HERMA H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 323–29 (1974) and sources cited therein.
220. Wallach and Tenoso argued that “classifications based upon ‘illegitimate’ motherhood
should be constitutionally suspect” because of their infringement of “important rights of privacy in
sexual relationships and freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage (or non-marriage),
childbearing, and family form.” Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 131, at 60–61 (citations omitted).
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made powerfully, albeit sporadically, in the 1970s illegitimacy cases. But the
child-focused rationale for questioning illegitimacy penalties proved
remarkably resilient, with lasting consequences for sex equality, racial justice,
and marital supremacy.
In the 1970s, feminists initiated or joined challenges to an array of antiillegitimacy laws and policies, including the exemption of nonmarital fathers
from liability for child support; limitations on illegitimate children’s ability to
inherit from their fathers; laws requiring mothers to disclose their children’s
paternity or face penalties including loss of public assistance, fines, and
incarceration; employment bans on the parents of illegitimate children; and the
exclusion of illegitimate children and their parents from various federal
government benefits. As Section I.A describes, feminist arguments emphasized
how these laws imposed a disproportionate economic and social burden on
women, especially poor women of color; curtailed women’s sexual autonomy
and invaded their privacy; and infringed upon women’s freedom to choose to
bear children. Feminists defended unmarried mothers against charges of sin
and selfishness, lauding their courage, independence, strength of character, and
devotion to their children. Section I.B takes a brief detour to consider the
Social Security Act cases, a rare instance in which sex equality claims did not
surface. Finally, Section I.C describes how the Court circumvented feminist
arguments against illegitimacy penalties, selectively embracing child-focused
arguments and sidestepping or rejecting sex discrimination claims against these
laws and policies. 221
A. “Designed to Subordinate Females”: Feminist Arguments Against
Illegitimacy Penalties
Linda Gomez believed Francisco Perez when he told her he was not
married. They met at a party and began dating. Perhaps she thought he would
someday be her husband when she became pregnant with his child. Certainly
she might have thought he would be responsible for supporting their daughter.
She would have been wrong on all counts. Perez, it turned out, was married to
another woman and had no intention of marrying Linda or of supporting their
daughter Zoraida. And under Texas statutory and common law, Linda and
Zoraida had no remedy: state courts had long held that fathers were not liable
for supporting their illegitimate children. 222
221. For the purposes of this Essay, I use the term “feminist” to describe arguments that
emphasized how illegitimacy penalties perpetuated women’s subordination. This Part briefly discusses
nonmarital fathers’ claims of sex discrimination to the extent that they illuminate the feminist
arguments that are this Essay’s primary subject. There is much more to be said about nonmarital
fathers and feminists’ ambivalence about their constitutional claims to parental rights; I pursue that
topic in depth elsewhere. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights
in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
222. Texas was an outlier in this regard; by the late 1960s, other holdouts had enacted or
revised their support statutes to include “natural” fathers. KRAUSE, supra note 20, at 22.
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Plaintiffs in Gomez v. Perez, one of two Texas child support cases to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 1970s, pioneered the argument that
placing the full burden of economic support for nonmarital children on mothers
violated equal protection. Legal aid attorneys representing Linda Gomez wrote
in their brief to the Supreme Court in 1972: “Equally as onerous as the State’s
discrimination against the illegitimate child is its invidious scheme to place the
entire burden of supporting such child on the female parent. To extoll the
virtues of motherhood but be blind to its toils may be fact, but should it be
law?” 223 Linda R.S., challenging the exclusion of nonmarital fathers from
liability under Texas’s criminal non-support statute, similarly emphasized the
economic hardship imposed on mothers of nonmarital children while fathers
escaped scot-free. Although “employed full time,” Linda had “very little
money,” and according to federal court papers filed in 1970, could not maintain
her daughter “in a manner equal to the opportunities and privileges of a
comparably situated ‘father-supported’ child.” 224
Plaintiffs elaborated the economic burden argument in challenges to laws
that limited nonmarital children’s ability to inherit from their intestate fathers,
including in the leading Supreme Court case, Trimble v. Gordon. In 1974,
twenty-eight-year-old Sherman Gordon of Chicago died suddenly, “the victim
of a homicide.” 225 He left no spouse and one child, four-year-old Deta Mona
Trimble. Under Illinois law, Gordon’s parents and siblings stood to inherit his
estate—an almost-new Plymouth automobile worth about $2,500—even
though Gordon had been adjudicated Deta Mona’s father and held liable for
child support while he lived. 226 Gordon had lived with Deta Mona and her
mother, Jessie, until his death: Ms. Trimble described Gordon to the Probate
Court as her “common law husband” but she understood that “that don’t
count.” 227
The same year, in Fernandez v. Shapp, Philadelphia’s Community Legal
Services collaborated with feminist lawyer Ann Freedman of the Women’s
Law Project to bring a federal class action lawsuit challenging Pennsylvania’s
inheritance laws. The state’s intestate succession law precluded children born
“out of wedlock” from inheriting from their fathers, and vice-versa. 228 When
fathers bequeathed property to their illegitimate children, those children paid a
223. Brief for Appellant at 20, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (No. 71-575), 1972 WL
136247.
224. Appendix at 11, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (No. 71-6078) (Stipulated
Statement of Fact).
225. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764 (1977).
226. Id. Deta Mona would have inherited her father’s estate in full had she been legitimate.
227. Record of Proceedings in Trial Court, In re Gordon, No. 74 P 5902 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
Cnty. Probate), reprinted in Appendix at 16, 19, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (No. 75-5952).
Illinois had abolished common law marriage in 1905.
228. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
at 10, No. 74-2959, Fernandez v. Shapp (E.D. Pa. 1976), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 34, Folder
11 (describing 20 Pa. Stat. § 2107; 72 Pa. Stat. §§ 2485-403, -404 (Supp. 1975)).
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higher tax on the inheritance. 229 Children and mothers, by contrast, could
inherit from one another regardless of legitimacy or intestacy and paid no extra
inheritance tax. 230
Both Fernandez and Trimble highlighted that, by limiting the paternal
inheritance rights of nonmarital children, the law placed an unfair economic
burden on mothers. “When one parent dies, the surviving parent obviously
retains the duty of support and maintenance of the child as a legal matter,”
Freedman and her colleagues wrote, “and as a practical matter, the burden . . .
becomes greater because it is no longer shared.” 231 Moreover, mothers suffered
a “clear economic disadvantage” compared with surviving fathers, a
disadvantage exacerbated by the inheritance laws. 232 “[T]he child’s mother, as
sole surviving parent, is burdened with the far more onerous task of supporting
a child who has no claim against his or her father’s estate . . . requiring [the
mother] to replace the support previously provided by the father.” 233
Like feminists of earlier eras who decried sexual double standards,
advocates also highlighted how illegitimacy classifications shamed and
penalized sexually active unmarried women while allowing men to engage in
nonmarital sex and procreation with impunity. Lois Fernandez, an African
American single mother of two, a Philadelphia community activist, and a
plaintiff in Fernandez v. Shapp, later recalled: “[T]he thing that bothered me
the most was that . . . [t]he question of the fathers never came up. . . . [T]here
were the mothers, who were considered ‘whores,’ or ‘illicit women,’ and then
there were the children, who were considered ‘bastards,’ ‘illegit.’ I just
couldn’t accept that.” 234 Linda Gomez’s lawyers attributed Texas law’s “sexual
discrimination” in child support liability to the “days of antiquity, when men
were ‘free to sow their wild oats’ while society endowed women, the weaker
sex, with the duty to remain chaste, or at least guard against the ‘accidents of
love.’” 235 Courts should ask, they contended, “what possible legitimate state
interest is promoted by singling out the female partner to acts of sexual

229. See id. at 10–11.
230. See id. at 10.
231. Id. at 28.
232. Id.
233. Id.; see also Brief of the Appellants at 56, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (No.
75-5952), 1976 WL 181301.
234. Fernandez later described her ensuing campaign to persuade lawmakers and judges to
reconsider Pennsylvania’s illegitimacy laws. Lois Fernandez, Legitimate, COWBIRD (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://cowbird.com/story/83078/Legitimate_By_Lois_Fernandez; see also Kendall Wilson, A
Mother’s War on ‘Illegitimate,’ PHILA. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2003 (“During her crusade, she was constantly
beating back the stereotype of unwed mothers—particularly Black unwed women in this situation—as
‘whores gobbling up welfare.’”).
235. Brief for Appellant at 21, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (No. 71-575), 1972 WL
136247.
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promiscuity [and] forcing her, and her alone, to bear the economic
consequences.” 236
The most sophisticated version of this argument appeared in Katie Mae
Andrews’s attack on a Mississippi school district’s ban on hiring unwed
parents, filed in 1973. 237 In Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School
District, social psychologist Kenneth Clark (author of the “doll studies” cited in
Brown) 238 testified that the challenged rule was part of “a long history of
discrimination against females on matters of sex and sexual behavior . . .
designed to subordinate females to an essentially inferior role, which the power
of our society is mobilized to reinforce.” 239 An amicus brief from the ACLU
Women’s Rights Project and Equal Rights Advocates condemned illegitimacy
penalties as a historical pillar of women’s subordination, part of a “double
standard of sexual morality” that visited harsh punishments for nonmarital sex
on women alone. 240 “The history of anti-illegitimacy measures,” the feminist
groups declared, “is thematically linked to discrimination against women.” 241
Depriving women of any claim on fathers’ resources also infringed upon
their reproductive freedom, advocates contended. For many women, the ability
to exercise control over reproduction meant more than the right to use
contraception or to terminate a pregnancy. Poor women, especially unmarried
women of color, faced involuntary sterilization at the hands of doctors who
took it upon themselves—often with explicit or tacit encouragement from
government officials—to curb the fertility of populations considered burdens
on the public fisc. 242 For these women, some of whom had religious or moral
236. Id. at 20.
237. See generally Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss.
1973), aff’d, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976).
238. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
239. MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 151 (quoting Appendix at 188, Drew
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (No. 74-1318)).
240. Brief for Equal Rights Advocates Inc. and ACLU as Amici Curiae at 9–11, Drew Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318), 1974 WL 175944 (quotation marks
omitted).
241. Id. at 5. (“The concept of “illegitimacy” has varied in its legal dimensions across cultures
and eras . . . With this pervasive variability, one constant appears: where legal and moral authorities
have punished the offspring of sexual intercourse occurring outside the bounds of approved
relationships, those authorities have likewise punished the maternal biological parents of these
children . . . .”); see also Brief for Respondents at 61, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425
U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318), 1976 WL 194019 (“[The rule] penalizes the unwed mother who assumes
responsibility for the care and nurturance of the child and ignores the abandoning father, effectively
rewarding his irresponsibility.”).
242. On involuntary sterilization, see REBECCA KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION
AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950–1980 (2009); JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR
AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2003); JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION:
BIRTH CONTROL, STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE (2005);
ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER BREEDING IN
AMERICA (2005); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION,
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997).

2015]

THE NONMARITAL FAMILY

1317

objections to abortion, 243 the private relationship between woman and
physician elevated by Blackmun’s opinion in Roe v. Wade was often a site of
coercion rather than cooperative counsel.
Accordingly, Rhonda Copelon and Nancy Stearns, young feminist
lawyers from the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) argued in Andrews
that excluding unwed mothers from employment encouraged abortion,
penalized women who chose to continue rather than terminate a pregnancy, and
violated the reproductive liberty protected by Roe v. Wade. 244 The appearance
in court of civil rights icon Fannie Lou Hamer, a well-known victim of
involuntary sterilization, poignantly drove home this point in a region where
such procedures were common enough to be called “Mississippi
appendectom[ies].” 245 To exercise genuine reproductive freedom, Dallas
attorney Windle Turley argued in Linda R.S. to judges who had recently
considered Roe v. Wade, unmarried women must be able to draw on all
possible sources of financial support lest they be denied meaningful
reproductive choice. 246 “Because of such state enforced economic hardship,
[unmarried mothers in Texas] are not permitted to freely elect between keeping
and rearing their child and the alternatives of placing that child for adoption or
even having its birth aborted.” 247
Some illegitimacy penalties continued the tradition of invasively
patrolling poor women’s personal lives by conditioning their livelihoods on
disclosure. Invoking a right to privacy to challenge laws and practices that
forced disclosure of intimate relationships, plaintiffs followed in the footsteps
of Mrs. Sylvester Smith. 248 Roe v. Norton, for instance, attacked a Connecticut
statute that punished poor unmarried mothers’ failure to disclose the name of
their children’s fathers with a contempt citation that carried a fine and up to one
243. Andrews testified, “God put us here on earth and if it came up to that I feel that we should
have them, you know. If we try to get rid of it, as most people do, that’s killing it. Well, you know
where we would wind up then.” MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 156.
244. See generally id. at 145–67; Teachers: Discrimination Against Unwed Mothers, 3
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 28 (1975). As CCR lawyer Jan Goodman put it, “We are arguing that all
women should have the freedom to choose . . . whatever the choice is, to bear the child or to abort.”
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 155.
245. NELSON, supra note 242, at 68. Fannie Lou Hamer also personally opposed abortion. On
Fannie Lou Hamer’s life, see CHANA KAI LEE, FOR FREEDOM’S SAKE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU
HAMER (1999); KAY MILLS, THIS LITTLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU HAMER (1994).
246. Plaintiff’s Complaint, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., Civ. No. 3-4336-B (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3,
1970), reprinted in Appendix at 6–7, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (No. 71-6078);
see also Brief for Appellants at 10, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (No. 71-6078). The threejudge federal district court panel that heard Linda R.S. included Judge Sarah Hughes, who dissented
from the panel’s denial of standing on child-focused grounds. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 335 F.
Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (Hughes, J., dissenting).
247. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 246; see also id. at 7 (“Said statutes deprive unwed
pregnant women and unwed mothers of their federal constitutional rights” under the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments including “the fundamental right of all women to freely choose whether to
bear children” and “whether to keep their children.”).
248. See supra Part I.C; see also PLECK, supra note 2, ch. 3; Solinger, supra note 109.
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year in prison. 249 The Connecticut law was part of the latest attempt by states to
mandate that unmarried mothers whose families might be eligible for public
assistance cooperate with government officials in establishing paternity. 250 One
mother, Rosalynn Carr, told the judge hearing her case: “I would consider it a
gross intrusion on my privacy to have to give the [father’s] name.” 251 The
mothers’ brief to the Supreme Court stressed that “for a woman to appear in
court, be examined and cross-examined as to the names of persons with whom
she had sexual intercourse, their address and other identifying information, and
other details of her past sexual conduct, is a humiliating and degrading
experience.” 252
Plaintiffs also argued that illegitimacy penalties violated a broader right to
decisional autonomy in matters related to sex, marriage, and family. Mothers
who challenged mandatory paternity disclosure claimed the prerogative to
make financial and interpersonal decisions for their families without state
interference. They drew on the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of sexual privacy
decisions, the recognition of some rights for unmarried fathers in Stanley v.
Illinois, and a series of parental rights cases stretching back to the early part of
the twentieth century. 253 The Mississippi plaintiffs contended that banning
unwed mothers from employment “infringes one of the most sacred and private
aspects of the family relationship—that between parent and child—by literally
conditioning employment on the abandonment of one’s child and thereby
punishing the maintenance of the parent-child relationship.” 254
Though the Court had ignored advocates’ invitation in the early litigation
to address illegitimacy penalties’ disparate impact on African Americans and
249. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975). Married mothers, of course, were not subjected to
this indignity since their husbands’ paternity generally was presumed. For an in-depth study of Roe v.
Norton and the underlying issues from a children’s rights perspective, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Roe
v. Norton: Coerced Maternal Cooperation, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW
REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 365 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985). For a contemporaneous critical
perspective on the case, see Aviam Soifer, Parental Autonomy, Family Rights, and the Illegitimate: A
Constitutional Commentary, 7 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1974).
250. As welfare policy advocate Elizabeth Wickenden wrote in an internal memo, “The mother
is shamed, coerced, denied the dignity of her own judgment about the best interest of her child and
ultimately runs the risk of imprisonment.” Elizabeth Wickenden, “Policy Background of Roe v.
Norton,” Justine Wise Polier Papers [hereinafter Polier Papers], MC413, Box 138, Folder: Roe v.
Norton—CDF (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
251. Appendix of Brief of Children of Appellants at 14a, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (No. 736033).
252. Brief for Appellants at 50, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (No. 73-6033), 1974 WL 186122;
see also Justine Wise Polier, Memo to File: April 24, 1974, Roe v. Norton, Polier Papers, Box 138,
Folder: Roe v. Norton—CDF (listing as the first of several “serious constitutional issues” raised by the
case the mother’s “right to remain silent,” her “right to privacy” and “her right to be protected from
public humiliation”). Similarly, in the Mississippi teachers’ case, plaintiffs complained that school
officials invasively “investigated” job applicants’ personal lives to uncover evidence of past
nonmarital childbirth. See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 157.
253. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants, supra note 252.
254. Brief of Respondents at 36, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559
(1976) (No. 74-1318), 1976 WL 181168.
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the poor, race discrimination arguments persisted in several subsequent
cases. 255 Race played an especially prominent role in Andrews, the Mississippi
teachers’ case. All five applicants denied jobs were African American women,
and as many as 40 percent of the Drew school district’s African American
students were born to unmarried parents. Superintendent George F. Pettey
presided over a school district that had mightily resisted desegregation; after
most whites decamped to “segregation academies,” Drew’s student population
was 80 percent black, but the number of white teachers and administrators rose.
The school district’s attorney, Champ Terney, was segregationist Senator
James O. Eastland’s son-in-law, and he called Ernest van den Haag, a
prominent defender of racial segregation in the 1950s, to testify. Andrews’s
attorney, twenty-four-year-old Charles Victor McTeer, an African American
protégé of Morty Stavis at CCR, secured the testimony of civil rights paragons
Kenneth Clark and Fannie Lou Hamer. 256
Cases that involved obvious and direct harm to unmarried mothers and
did not foreground discriminatory impact on presumptively innocent children
risked an unsympathetic reception. Many continued to believe it fair, or at least
sound social policy, for women to shoulder the blame for exposing their
children to the iniquity of illegitimate status and to the penury of paternal
absence. For plaintiffs, these cases provided an opportunity to defend the moral
character of mothers who bore sole responsibility for their children’s care, and
to argue that unmarried mothers deserved social support, not condemnation.
For instance, when the Drew, Mississippi, school district defended its
policy as necessary to protect children from moral corruption and to stem the
tide of “schoolgirl pregnancies,” Hamer and Mae Bertha Carter staunchly
defended the integrity of Andrews and the other young women turned away by
Superintendent Pettey. 257 Mrs. Carter, the (married) mother of thirteen children

255. See, e.g., N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491 (D. N.J. 1971), aff’d, 411
U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam); Brief for Appellants at 30, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972)
(No. 70-5064) (arguing that Texas’s allocation of AFDC and other welfare benefits discriminated
against nonmarital families of color based on race and family status). The internal correspondence of
advocates involved in Roe v. Norton emphasized how mandatory paternity disclosure for AFDC
recipients disproportionately affected African American women and children. See, e.g., Wickenden,
supra note 250. Lois Fernandez recalled her own mother’s skepticism that she could successfully
challenge a “white man’s law.” See Fernandez, supra note 234.
256. See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 149–52. Andrews’s attorneys
argued, inter alia, that the school district’s “illegitimacy rule constitutes a race-based classification,
built upon the legacy of slavery, and discriminates against Black women and their children.” Brief of
Respondents at 64, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318). They
noted “the overwhelming correlation of race and illegitimacy” and projected that the black–white
adoption differential and the “illegitimate” birthrate in Sunflower County combined to yield “144
Black identifiably illegitimate children for every one white child similarly situated.” Id. at 65.
257. See, e.g., Respondents at 24, 28, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559
(No. 74-1318) (summarizing Hamer’s testimony) (“She believed that the community had great respect
for those young women who, after bearing children out of wedlock, returned to school to get an
education or a better job, or otherwise sought gainful employment to avoid the welfare rolls. As an
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who had almost singlehandedly integrated the Drew public schools, testified
that she would be proud to see Ms. Andrews teach her children. 258
Hamer’s and Carter’s testimony valorized the plaintiffs’ efforts to lift
themselves out of poverty and support their children on their own as evidence
of strong character rather than moral delinquency. Hamer highlighted the
catch-22 imposed by powerful whites on black families generally and black
women in particular: single mothers were damned if they relied on stingy and
stigmatized public assistance, and damned if they sought a decent living
through employment in the public school system. “[W]hen you say we are
lifting ourselves up and you tell us to get off of welfare, then when peoples try
to go to school to get off of welfare to support themselves, this is another way
of knocking them down.” 259 Hamer’s testimony depicted Andrews and her
compatriots as responsible citizens, eschewing public assistance in favor of
employment and self-sufficiency.
The challenge to Connecticut’s mandatory paternity disclosure law also
sought to rehabilitate unmarried mothers, who stood accused of depriving
children already marked by illegitimacy of paternal knowledge and support.
“Why,” asked the Connecticut attorney general, “should a mother be permitted,
by her inaction, to cast her child into the eternal caverns of illegitimacy[?]” 260
Federal district Judge M. Joseph Blumenfeld decried the “anguish suffered by
illegitimate children denied the satisfaction of knowing their paternity,” 261
declaring the interests of “recalcitrant mother[s]” 262 diametrically opposed to
those of their “innocent children.” 263 The statute, he wrote, “operates
prophylactically against the adverse differential treatment which the unwed
mothers would impose on their children” by withholding information about

example, she noted that Ms. [Andrews] had a fine reputation in her community, primarily because of
her own effort . . . to further her education.” (citations omitted)).
258. See Appendix at 113–14, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No.
74-1318).
259. Id. at 102. Andrews testified that she had taken a factory job in a nearby town that paid
significantly less than a teacher’s aide salary in order to provide for her son. When Rogers lost her job
because of Pettey’s rule, she “was thereby forced onto the welfare rol[l]s in order to provide for her
child.” Brief for Respondents at 5, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 741318), 1976 WL 194019. Hamer also vigorously disputed the notion that sexual behavior varied by
race. Appendix, supra note 258, at 103. She had worked for white families all her life, Hamer said, and
knew nonmarital sex to be at least as common among them. Id. Clark, too, took pains to emphasize the
moral neutrality of sexual activity and rejected any connection between nonmarital childbearing and
lower moral standards. “[U]nwed parenthood reflects the inability or lack of knowledge . . . as to how
to avoid unwed parenthood, if it is undesired,” he stated in his deposition. Id. at 192.
260. Brief of the Appellee at 10, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975) (No. 73-6033), 1974 WL
186124.
261. Doe v. Norton 356 F. Supp. 202, 206 n.6 (D. Conn. 1973), supplemented, 365 F. Supp. 65
(D. Conn. 1973), vacated sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975).
262. 365 F. Supp. at 72.
263. Id. at 79 n.23.
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their fathers and depriving them of their best possible source of financial
support. 264
The plaintiffs in Roe v. Norton, represented by Frank Cochran of the
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union (CCLU), objected strongly to these assaults
on mothers’ character. The stringent sanctions imposed for noncompliance
produced a record replete with poignant testimony from women who feared
that disclosing fathers’ identities would have devastating consequences. Some
mothers recounted how fathers had threatened physical harm to them and their
children if their identities were revealed. Others worried that fathers who had
taken a voluntary interest in their children would skip town forever if found
legally liable for child support. Some women had moved on to new
relationships and feared that disclosure would jeopardize their plans for
marriage and adoption by a new stepfather. 265
Cochran also secured the testimony of child welfare experts to counter the
state’s contention that paternity disclosure always served nonmarital children’s
best interests. They testified that forcing an unwilling mother to identify her
child’s father would cause material and psychological harm to the child that
would rarely, if ever, be outweighed by the often illusory promise of financial
or psychic benefits from establishing paternity. 266 And incarcerating a
mother—usually the “primary” “psychological parent”—would be
“catastrophic,” according to prominent pediatric psychiatrist Albert Solnit, coauthor of the influential Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. 267 Moreover, he
said, a mother, “the one who has the care and the responsibility and the loving
affectionate bond” with a child, should be the one to determine the child’s best
interests. 268 Mothers, the plaintiffs argued, should be considered champions,
not enemies, of their children’s well being. 269
By the mid-1970s, advocates could rely upon a growing complement of
constitutional sex equality precedents to support their case against the sex
discriminatory effects of illegitimacy penalties. 270 To the extent that
illegitimacy penalties could be framed as sex-based classifications, advocates
264. Id. at 79. Judge Blumenfeld was later remembered for his liberal rulings in areas such as
abortion and domestic violence. See Alfonso A. Narvaez, M. Joseph Blumenfeld, Judge, 84, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1988.
265. Appendix at 29–35, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975) (No. 73-6033) (1975); Sugarman,
supra note 249, at 389–90.
266. See, e.g., Appendix, supra note 265, at 62–71 (deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M.D.).
267. Id. Children “cannot escape the devastating impact of the loss of the person who has taken
care of them since they were born, helpless as an infant into this world,” Solnit testified. Id. at 66.
268. Id. at 67.
269. The plaintiffs’ lawyers did not, in the end, rely upon the expert testimony at trial. See
Sugarman, supra note 249, at 391.
270. State Equal Rights Amendments served as additional ammunition in some cases: the
Women’s Law Project’s Ann Freedman relied on Pennsylvania’s ERA as well as the federal Equal
Protection Clause in Fernandez. See generally Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, No. 74-2959, Fernandez v. Shapp (E.D. Pa. 1976), collected in
Dorsen Papers, Box 34, Folder 11.
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used the Reed/Frontiero line of cases to invoke heightened scrutiny of the
relationship between means and ends. And the disparate impact on women of
restricting the employment of parents of nonmarital children called such
policies into question under both statutory and constitutional precedents. As
Texas federal district court Judge Sarah T. Hughes concluded in her 1971
decision holding a bank’s ban on hiring unmarried parents unlawful under Title
VII, “it is common knowledge that it is easier to determine if a woman has
illegitimate children than men.” 271 Arguments of this kind loomed large in
Andrews, where the employment ban ostensibly excluded all unmarried
parents—but Superintendent Pettey himself admitted that his rule did not affect
unwed fathers. 272 When it came to pregnancy, women, not men, were, as he put
it, “stuck with the result.” 273
Plaintiffs capitalized on recent feminist defeats as well as victories. The
Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Kahn v. Shevin 274 (upholding a property tax
exemption for widows against a sex discrimination challenge) frustrated
advocates who saw in Kahn remnants of courts’ old patronizing attitude toward
women. But Kahn also highlighted women’s economic disadvantage,
especially after the death of the men on whom they depended for financial
support. “There can be no dispute,” Justice Douglas wrote for the Kahn
majority, “that the financial difficulties confronting the lone woman . . . exceed
those facing the man. . . . [T]he job market is inhospitable to the woman
seeking any but the lowest paid jobs.” 275 In Kahn, the “lone woman” in
question was a presumably elderly widow whose marital bargain of financial
support in exchange for family care had been disrupted through no fault of her
own. In intestacy cases such as Fernandez and Trimble, the plaintiffs argued
that women who had never married—and quite possibly had never depended
upon their children’s fathers for financial support—should benefit from the
same principle. Thus, the intestacy plaintiffs implicitly challenged the
privileged position widows held by virtue of marriage.
Then, in 1975, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld provided a precedent that
seemed tailor-made for challenging sex discriminatory illegitimacy

271. DARWIN PAYNE, INDOMITABLE SARAH: THE LIFE OF JUDGE SARAH T. HUGHES 299
(2004) (quoting Sarah T. Hughes) (citations omitted). For more on early cases challenging bans on
unmarried mothers’ employment, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, ch. 5; Serena
Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713 (2015).
272. Appendix at 39, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (No. 741318). When asked how she knew that the only male teacher’s aide in the elementary school did not
have any illegitimate children, the official who had turned Andrews away replied, “He is married.” Id.
at 55.
273. Id. at 39.
274. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
275. Id. at 353; see also Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 228, at 29 (“[H]ere, in an
analogous situation, the statute is doing the opposite of what was approved in Kahn.” (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted)).
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classifications. 276 The exclusion of widowers and their children from Social
Security survivors’ benefits available to widows, Justice Brennan wrote,
“discriminates among surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of the
surviving parent.” 277 So, argued plaintiffs’ lawyers, did many state intestacy
laws. 278 By the mid-1970s, sex equality arguments seemed among the most
potent weapons against the only remaining negative precedent, Labine v.
Vincent. But these arguments were conspicuously absent from the challenges to
illegitimacy classifications in the Social Security Act that reached the Court in
the mid-1970s. The next Section briefly considers these cases before describing
the fate of feminist and other arguments against illegitimacy penalties in the
Supreme Court.
B. “Promoting Equality Between Illegitimate and Legitimate Children”: The
Social Security Cases
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld came too late to be helpful to Ramon Jimenez
and his attorneys. Ramon Jimenez and Elizabeth Hernandez had lived together
in Chicago with their three children. 279 When Hernandez left the family in
1968, Jimenez found himself caring for a five-year-old, a three-year-old, and an
infant alone. 280 Disabled since 1963, Jimenez had previously claimed Social
Security benefits for his legal wife, Filomena, and their five children, all of
whom remained in Jimenez’s native Puerto Rico. 281 But when Jimenez applied
for benefits on behalf of the three nonmarital children he had lived with and
supported from birth, he discovered that only the eldest, Magdalena, was
eligible. 282 Puzzled, Jimenez sought counsel from the Chicago Legal
Assistance Foundation. 283 Illegitimate children, they discovered, could only
receive insurance benefits if they were born prior to the onset of the wageearner’s disability. 284 In contrast, “[a]fter-born” legitimate children—regardless
of whether they lived with or were supported by their wage-earning parent—
were automatically eligible for benefits. 285 In Illinois, the only way to

276. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
277. Id. at 651. Quoting Stanley, he declared: “[A] father, no less than a mother, has a
constitutionally protected right to the ‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of ‘the
children he has sired and raised.’” Id. at 652.
278. Reed v. Reed proved invaluable to plaintiffs in the intestacy cases for strategic as well as
substantive reasons. See Telephone Interview with James Weill and Jane Greengold Stevens (Aug. 6,
2013).
279. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 630 (1974).
280. Id.
281. Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, in New York, N.Y. (June 19, 2013).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634–36 (1974).
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legitimate a child was for the parents to marry each other, not a practical option
for Ramon Jimenez. 286
To Jimenez’s attorney Jane Greengold Stevens, the statute seemed
“blatantly unfair” to nonmarital children, who were powerless to change their
parents’ marital status. 287 Though their claim was an “everyday” matter, far
from a carefully selected test case, Stevens later realized that Ramon Jimenez
and his children were “a poster family for promoting equality between
legitimate and illegitimate children,” since Ramon had lived with the children
their whole lives and indeed had become their sole source of support and
care. 288 The government’s concern about collusive or fraudulent claims of
paternity might have been warranted in cases involving an absent or delinquent
father, but Jimenez was neither.
In hindsight, Jimenez was a possible but hardly an obvious vehicle for a
sex discrimination claim. The overall statutory scheme, by limiting the
circumstances under which illegitimate children were eligible for benefits, left
many women in the lurch—arguably a disparate impact. 289 But in Jimenez, the
mother had left the family. And unlike the child support cases, where paternal
non-support obviously burdened mothers and absolved fathers, the
discrimination challenged in Jimenez affected both men and women. In any
event, Stevens, though an ardent feminist, simply did not see Jimenez as a sex
discrimination case. She later recalled approaching the problem of illegitimacybased classifications as an anti-poverty lawyer primarily concerned with the
welfare of children. 290
Mathews v. Lucas, like Jimenez, involved an illegitimacy-based
classification in the federal Social Security Act, denying survivors’ benefits to
certain illegitimate children who could not prove they were dependent upon
their father at the time of his death. Unlike Jimenez, though, the facts in
Mathews v. Lucas arguably lent themselves to a sex discrimination claim. 291
Belmira Lucas had lived in Providence with Robert Cuffee for approximately
twenty years, and borne him two children, Darin and Ruby. 292 Lucas despaired
of divorcing her legal spouse, Raymond Lucas, because of his severe

286. Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 281.
287. Telephone Interview with John Henry Schlegel (March 22, 2013); Interview with Jane
Greengold Stevens, supra note 281.
288. Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 281.
289. As Herbert Semmel explained in 1969, “At present, when illegitimate children do not
qualify for Social Security benefits it is usually because their claim is based on the eligibility and
earnings of their father. . . . [M]ost illegitimates can qualify for children’s benefits based on their
mother’s account. However, a mother may have insufficient quarters of covered earnings to qualify
either herself or the child for benefits or she may have a lower earning base than the father . . . . In
many cases, the father dies, becomes disabled or retires before the mother’s status entitles the child to
benefits.” Semmel, supra note 88, at 294.
290. Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 281.
291. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
292. Appendix at 10, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (No. 75-88).
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disabilities. 293 Lucas therefore had trouble proving that her relationship with
Cuffee was a valid common law marriage under Rhode Island law, 294 though
she testified that Cuffee gave her a ring symbolizing their marriage in 1950,
four years after they began living together. 295 Robert supported Darin and
Ruby, and they called him Daddy. 296 But when Raymond died in 1965,
Belmira did not marry Robert—perhaps out of embarrassment at having lived
so long out of wedlock, as she told the court, 297 or perhaps because of Robert’s
drinking and violent behavior, which led their relationship to dissolve shortly
thereafter. 298
Robert left to live with his mother in 1966; Belmira testified that he saw
the children two or three times per week and gave Ruby money from his
mother and aunt while he was unable to work. 299 In the meantime, Belmira was
providing most of her family’s support, working for the local electric company.
When Robert died in 1968, Darin and Ruby were not eligible for survivors’
benefits because they could not prove that they were dependent upon Robert at
the time of his death. This result left Belmira Lucas high and dry—not in spite
of the fact that she had been the primary breadwinner during the final years of
Robert’s life, but because their children had depended upon her and not him. 300
Even so, as in Jimenez there was no sex-based distinction apparent on the face
of the statute—only arguably a disparate impact on women—and so it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Lucas’ attorneys did not argue sex discrimination.
But in their omission of sex equality arguments, the Social Security cases were
the exception in 1970s illegitimacy litigation rather than the rule. 301
C. “The Risks All Seem to Be on Her Side”: Failure in the Supreme Court
None of the feminist-inflected arguments explored in Section II.A
penetrated Supreme Court opinions. Court victories for illegitimacy plaintiffs
relied on Weber’s child-focused rationale. Several cases with explicitly
feminist framings settled or were rendered effectively moot by statutory and

293. See id. at 51.
294. Id. at 32 (describing relationship as “common law union” and explaining that the couple
did not marry because “she was not free to marry”); see also id. at 66–70 (administrative law judge’s
ruling against recognizing common law marriage).
295. Id. at 48.
296. Id. at 27.
297. Id. at 61.
298. See id. at 49.
299. Id. at 11–14, 26–27.
300. Another challenge to the same provision featured a sixteen-year-old father and a fourteenyear-old mother; the young parents had lived with their parents, and the father had never supported the
child because he left to serve in Vietnam, where he was killed at nineteen. See Norton v. Mathews, 427
U.S. 524 (1976).
301. And by the time she became involved in her second and third illegitimacy cases (Trimble
and Lalli, both intestacy cases), sex equality arguments were a regular part of Jane Greengold
Stevens’s repertoire.
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regulatory developments. And the 1970s ended with a series of disheartening
defeats for illegitimacy plaintiffs.
1. Weber Redux, 1973–1977
Despite the prominent place of sex equality claims in the Texas child
support cases, child-focused arguments again prevailed. Justice Byron White
wrote a short per curiam opinion in Gomez v. Perez (1973), holding that to
“den[y] such an essential right” as child support “to a child simply because its
natural father has not married its mother” was “illogical and unjust.” 302
In Trimble v. Gordon (1977), the Justices’ internal debates focused
primarily on the wisdom of overturning Labine. 303 Clerk Gene Comey advised
Powell to “hit Labine where it really hurts: the statement that the social
difference between a wife and a concubine is analogous to the social difference
between a legitimate and an illegitimate child. It may be,” wrote Comey, “that
the state has the power to say that the wife takes property and the concubine
does not. It cannot be said that such a rule is illogical or unjust . . . [it] has some
relationship to individual responsibility. But with respect to illegitimate
children, the opposite is true.” 304 Powell’s majority opinion borrowed heavily
from Weber, and reflected Comey’s suggested reasoning: “The parents have
the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate
children can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.” 305 The
five-to-four decision confirmed the child-focused account of illegitimacy
penalties’ harm and sidestepped the sex discrimination question altogether. 306

302. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (quotations excluded); see also
N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam) (striking down a New Jersey law
awarding benefits to families according to parents’ marital status).
303. Both Blackmun’s and Powell’s conference notes suggest that Trimble’s relationship to
Labine was the focus of conference discussion. Blackmun correctly predicted that the Court would be
“sadly split” in Trimble. He was wrong, however, about how Powell would vote. Contrary to
Blackmun’s forecast that Powell would join Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist to affirm, Powell made
clear at conference that he strongly disliked Labine and would reverse the Illinois court. Memorandum
from Justice Blackmun, No. 75-5952, Trimble v. Gordon (Dec. 3, 1976), collected in Blackmun
Papers, Box 249, Folder 5; see also LFP Conference Notes, Fiallo v. Levi, No. 75-6297, Dec. 10,
1976, LFP Papers, at 39.
304. Bobtail Bench Memorandum from Gene Comey to Justice Powell, No. 75-5952, Trimble
v. Gordon (Dec. 6, 1976), at 3, collected in Powell Papers.
305. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). Four Justices dissented: Burger, Blackmun,
and Stewart agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that Labine—which all of them had joined—
should control. Stewart and Blackmun privately expressed misgivings about Labine. But Blackmun
disliked Powell’s majority opinion, writing in the margin of one draft: “W[oul]d not join this opinion
even if I agreed with the result.” Third Draft of Opinion for the Court in Trimble v. Gordon (Jan 24,
1977), at 1, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 249, Folder 5.
306. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762 at 766 (“As we conclude that the statutory discrimination against
illegitimate children is unconstitutional, we do not reach the sex discrimination argument.”). The race
discrimination question, Powell noted in a footnote, had been raised by the appellants below but was
not before the Court. Id. at 765 n.10.
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The most explicitly feminist illegitimacy cases never produced Supreme
Court opinions. Fernandez v. Shapp, the challenge to Pennsylvania’s
inheritance laws, settled shortly after Trimble was decided with an unpublished
consent decree. 307 The Justices used statutory and regulatory developments to
avoid issuing opinions in Roe v. Norton, the mandatory paternity disclosure
case, and Andrews, the unwed mothers’ employment case. 308
Then, in Mathews v. Lucas (1976), the Court interrupted a string of
victories for plaintiffs with a ruling that upheld an illegitimacy classification in
the Social Security Act. 309 Ironically, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the
majority in Lucas gave feminists a backhanded boost at the expense of the
campaign against illegitimacy penalties. Justifying the decision not to apply
strict scrutiny, Blackmun wrote that “discrimination against illegitimates has
never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and
political discrimination against women and Negroes.” 310 The only references to
sex discrimination in Lucas concerned the analogy—or lack thereof—between
sex- and illegitimacy-based classifications.
2. Making “the Most of a Bad Case”: Fiallo v. Bell and Lalli v. Lalli, 1977–
1978
In Fiallo v. Bell, another illegitimacy case decided on the same day as
Trimble in 1977, the sex discrimination issue was difficult to dodge, but the
case was also difficult to win. 311 Ramon Martin Fiallo was born in New York
in 1971 to Ramon Fiallo-Sone and Celia Francisca Michel Rodriguez, natives
of Guadeloupe who never married each other. Court papers described Ramon’s

307. See Adens ex rel. Green v. Schweiker, 773 F.2d 545, 547–48 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that
Pennsylvania’s discriminatory intestacy laws were “declared unconstitutional in a consent decree filed
on May 30, 1978, Fernandez v. Shapp, No. 74-2959 (E.D. Pa. 1987)”). Lois Fernandez and her allies
also successfully lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature to reform other state laws that discriminated
against nonmarital children and their parents. See Stephen Franklin, Mother Wins Fight to End Stigma
of Illegitimacy, BULLETIN (Philadelphia), Dec. 10, 1978, at 3; Pamela Smith, Lois Fernandez: Because
of Her, There are No More ‘Illegitimate Children’ in Pennsylvania, PHILA. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1979, at 1.
308. Roe v. Norton was remanded in light of a statutory change. Sugarman concluded in 1985
that Connecticut policy effectively remained the same as it was before the litigation. See Sugarman,
supra note 249. The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in Andrews as improvidently granted
because of a regulatory change prohibiting marital status discrimination against public schoolteachers.
For more, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 162–65 (describing the Justices’
consideration of Andrews). In another contemporaneous case, the Third Circuit upheld a public
library’s discharge of a Pennsylvania custodian and librarian for openly living together outside of
marriage. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court
denied the employees’ petition for certiorari over dissents from Justices Brennan and Marshall. See
Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Pub. Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (“Petitioners’ rights to pursue an open rather than a clandestine personal relationship
and to rear their child together in this environment closely resemble the other aspects of personal
privacy to which we have extended constitutional protection.”).
309. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
310. Id. at 506.
311. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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mother as the “bread-winner,” and his father as Ramon’s “primary caretaker
and constant companion.” 312 Ramon’s U.S. citizenship would have eased his
father’s path to legal residency had his parents married. Moreover, regulations
exempted mothers of illegitimate citizen children but not fathers from
restrictive immigration quotas. 313 Conversely, plaintiff Serge Warner, the West
Indian-born son of U.S. citizen Cleophus Warner, could not bypass the quota
system to become a permanent resident, as he could have done if his mother
had been a citizen—or if his parents had been married. 314 Plaintiff teenagers
Trevor and Earl Wilson were permanent U.S. residents whose Jamaican father
could not obtain a visa to move to the United States after the death of their
mother in 1974, though a mother (or a “legitimate” father) could have done
so. 315
Congress’s plenary power over immigration made challenging these sexand illegitimacy-based classifications an uphill battle. 316 Indeed, classifications
considered far more offensive to the Constitution flourished in American
immigration law, virtually untouched by the civil rights revolution. 317 But the
plaintiffs in Fiallo, their Legal Aid Society lawyers emphasized, included not
merely “aliens” but U.S. citizens and permanent residents. 318 They succeeded
in persuading one of three judges, former civil rights lawyer Jack B. Weinstein,
whose dissent proclaimed,
Legal discrimination between men and women or legitimates and
illegitimates with no rational basis is no longer tolerated. Where, as
here, statutory invidious discrimination punishes American citizens by
denying them familial association, one of the most precious attributes
of humanity, the courts should say what is plain: the statute is
unconstitutional. 319

312. Appendix at 6, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297) (Amended Complaint – Class
Action).
313. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 789; see also Brief for Appellants at 9–11, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (No. 75-6297).
314. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 803–04; see also Brief for Appellants, supra note 313, at 7–9.
315. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 790 n.3, 792 n.4; see also Brief for Appellants, supra note 313, at
11–13.
316. On Fiallo and how the plenary power doctrine operated in the executive and legislative
branches, see Kristin A. Collins, Plenary Power, Coordinate Branches, and Gender-Based Nationality
Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL (Kim Rubenstein &
Katharine G. Young eds.) (forthcoming 2016).
317. As two members of the three-judge district court empaneled to hear Fiallo wrote,
“alien[s]” could “be denied entrance on grounds which would be constitutionally suspect or
impermissible in the context of domestic policy, namely, race, physical condition, political beliefs,
sexual proclivities, age, and national origin.” Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff’d sub nom. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (internal citations omitted). For a fascinating
historical perspective, see Collins, supra note 27.
318. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 6–7, Fiallo v. Bell, 406 F. Supp 162 (No. 75-6297), 1976
WL 181344.
319. Fiallo, 406 F. Supp. at 169 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
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The Fiallo plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim focused almost exclusively
on discrimination against unwed fathers. 320 They presented empirical studies
demonstrating that unmarried fathers often had strong bonds with their
children. They argued that the challenged regulations unconstitutionally
“stereotyped” unwed fathers as uninvolved and uncaring when often—as in the
plaintiffs’ cases—the opposite was true. 321 In fact, the plaintiffs emphasized,
out-of-wedlock pregnancies most often occurred as a result of “exclusive longterm relationships between the mothers and the fathers.” 322
The regulations’ impact on mothers did not go unmentioned: in a
footnote, the plaintiffs’ brief clarified that although the “primary sex
discrimination imposed by the challenged provisions is against illegitimate
children and their fathers,” the law “discriminate[d] against women as well.” 323
A citizen or permanent resident father could rest assured that if he could not
care for his illegitimate citizen or permanent resident child, “that child can be
united in this country with the other parent, the mother.” 324 But a U.S. citizen
or permanent resident mother “has no similar assurance . . . since the father is
effectively barred from entering this country.” 325 As a result, Trevor and Earl
Wilson’s mother, Leony Moses, “could not be assured that upon her death her
children would be supported and cared for in this country” by their surviving
parent. 326
The footnote gave a tantalizing hint of a full-throated argument that the
citizenship laws discriminated against mothers as well as fathers. Like Paula
Wiesenfeld, whose Social Security benefits were worth less to her family than
a husband’s would have been, Leony Moses’s U.S. citizenship did not
guarantee her and her children the care of their “sole surviving parent.” 327
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine Ruth Bader Ginsburg making such an
argument, had she argued Fiallo. Ginsburg very much wanted to file an amicus
brief, but despite her repeated entreaties and Norman Dorsen’s support, Legal
Director Mel Wulf—author of the ACLU’s first constitutional analysis of
illegitimacy classifications sixteen years earlier—rejected the idea, for reasons
that are not entirely clear. 328 The Fiallo plaintiffs’ sex discrimination argument
remained limited to its detrimental effects on fathers. 329

320. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 318, at 23–31.
321. See id. at 23–26.
322. Id. at 26.
323. Id. at 24, n.17.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. The brief cited Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
328. See ACLU Memorandum to HEW, supra note 34. Janet Calvo was receptive to the idea as
well. See Letters from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Norman Dorsen & Mel Wulf (Dec. 4, 1975); Mel Wulf
to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Dec. 9, 1975); Janet M. Calvo to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Dec. 12, 1975) (“We
plan to appeal . . . and would welcome your participation as Amicus Curiae.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg
to Mel Wulf et al. (Dec. 17, 1975) (“Agree with Mel that this litigation is in good hands. However,
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Many did see the distinctions between fathers and mothers in Fiallo as
constitutionally problematic. Powell clerk J. Philip Jordan initially called them
“totally arbitrary sex discrimination” and deemed the government’s concern
that parents might bring unlimited numbers of illegitimate children to the
United States “a bunch of crap!” 330 But Congress’s plenary immigration power
proved a formidable obstacle, leading Powell to observe that the Legal Aid
Society’s brief made “the most of a bad case.” 331 Blackmun agreed, and even
Brennan and Marshall at first reluctantly joined the majority, before deciding to
dissent. 332 In the end, Powell wrote the majority opinion upholding the
challenged provision. 333 He apparently rejected clerk Gene Comey’s advice
that he not refer to “the perceived absence in most cases of close family ties”
between fathers and their nonmarital children as a rationale for the law. 334
Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Fiallo marked the first time that a Court
opinion discussed a claim of sex discrimination in a case involving nonmarital
families and illegitimacy-based classifications. 335 Citing the sex equality cases,

would very much like to do an amicus for the ACLU. . . . [I]f the Court is willing to entertain any
breach, Fiallo seems the most sympatique case one could bring up.”); Norman Dorsen to Mel Wulf
(Dec. 23, 1973) (“I vote to allow an amicus in Fiallo, on the condition that I get a look at it before it is
put into final form . . .”), collected in ACLU Records, Box 1380, Folder: Fiallo v. Levi.
329. The child-focused arguments so prominent in the illegitimacy cases were more muted in
Fiallo, handicapping the plaintiffs. One Justice told Legal Aid Society attorney Janet M. Calvo at oral
argument: “[Y]ou really are not entitled to rely on the cases that rely on the unfairness of visiting the
sins of the parents on their children.” Transcript of Oral Argument, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)
(No. 75-6297). Calvo pointed out that Glona had involved discrimination against a parent, but the
Justice did not seem convinced, insisting, “It’s on account of [the father’s] own conduct whereas in the
case we just heard before”—referring to Trimble, argued the same day—“the child was being
discriminated against on the account of his natural parents [sic] conduct.” Id.
330. Preliminary Memorandum for Justice Powell, No. 75-6297, Fiallo v. Levi (May 10, 1976),
at 1, 3 (handwritten notations of J. Philip Jordan), collected in Powell Papers. Later, however, Jordan
moderated his position. “[P]erhaps Congress’ power over immigration, plus need to avoid fraud, is
enough to justify it,” he wrote. See id. at 1.
331. Memorandum for Justice Powell, No. 75-6297, Fiallo v. Levi (Nov. 17, 1976), at 4,
collected in Powell Papers.
332. See Powell’s and Blackmun’s conference notes on Fiallo. LFP Conference Notes, No. 756297, Fiallo v. Levi (Dec. 10, 1976), at 18, collected in LFP Papers. Chief Justice Burger, in fact,
initially assigned the majority opinion to Marshall. Marshall declined. Letter from Justice Marshall to
Chief Justice Burger, Assignment of Opinion in Fiallo v. Levi (Dec. 13, 1976), collected in Powell
Papers.
333. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 788 (1977).
334. See id. at 799. Comey recommended that Powell avoid endorsing the Government’s
contention that “natural fathers and illegitimate children” were less likely to have a “strong interest in
intimacy” than other parent-child pairings. Bobtail Bench Memorandum from Gene Comey, No. 756297, Fiallo v. Levi (Dec. 6, 1976), at 4, collected in Powell Papers. Comey saw “no reason to rely on
this somewhat ‘distasteful’ argument,” which contradicted the Court’s recent move toward “a position
where legitimate and illegitimate families are generally considered to have a strong degree of family
intimacy and unity.” Id.
335. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the plaintiff raised the issue of sex
discrimination against fathers, but White’s opinion relied instead on concepts of due process. In
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), and especially Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976),
the plaintiffs could have, but did not, highlight how the challenged classifications disadvantaged
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the illegitimacy cases, and the “fundamental ‘freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life,’” 336 Marshall condemned the challenged
provisions. He credited the plaintiffs’ claim that the laws constituted “invidious
discrimination” against unwed fathers and illegitimate children and infringed
upon the parent-child relationship in ways foreclosed by decisions such as
Stanley and Wiesenfeld. 337 But Marshall’s dissent, too, framed the sex equality
issue as a matter of discrimination against fathers, not mothers.
The next illegitimacy case to reach the Court, Lalli v. Lalli, did not
present the most auspicious facts for raising sex (or race) discrimination
claims. 338 Mario Lalli ran a publishing company that specialized in “dream
books” for “bettors who play the numbers.” 339 In January 1973, Lalli’s body
was found riddled with bullets and wrapped in an awning in the Pelham Bay
section of the Bronx. Several days later, thirty-year-old William Farrell was
arrested for murder, a business dispute the apparent motive. 340
When he died, Mario was legally married to Rosamond Lalli but had lived
with Eileen Lalli, the mother of at least two of his children, for many years,
until Eileen’s death in 1968. When Mario and Eileen’s son Robert Lalli later
requested an accounting of Mario’s estate in the hope of claiming an
inheritance, the Surrogate’s Court turned him down. 341 New York law required
a court order of filiation during the father’s lifetime in order for a nonmarital
child to participate in probate proceedings. 342 While there was no question that
Mario had acknowledged, lived with, and supported Robert and his late sister
Maureen, the only documentary evidence Robert could produce were baptismal
certificates and a document in which Mario gave his consent to his “son”
Robert’s underage marriage. 343
In most of the earlier illegitimacy cases, advocates could frame the
plaintiffs as devoted but impoverished mothers, fathers, and innocent children
challenging laws motivated at least in part by disdain for illicit sex and

women and men on the basis of sex. In Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976),
and Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), plaintiffs and amici argued that the challenged
illegitimacy-based classifications harmed women by burdening them with sole responsibility for the
support of nonmarital children, but the Court declined to discuss sex discrimination on any terms.
336. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 810 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 813.
338. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
339. Son is Arrested in Slaying of ‘Dream Books’ Publisher, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1973, at 14.
340. Id. The Times reported that William was Mario’s “illegitimate” son, but Blackmun’s oral
argument notes indicate that William was the son of Mario’s deceased nonmarital partner, Eileen, by
another man.
341. Appendix at A-31 to A-32, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (No. 77-1115) (Decree of
Surrogate Evans V. Brewster); see also Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261–63.
342. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261–62.
343. See Appendix, supra note 341, at A-14 to A-17. Robert Lalli also introduced several
affidavits supporting his claim that he and his sister had lived with, been acknowledged by, and
received support from Mario Lalli. See id. at A-17 to A-28.

1332

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1277

illegitimacy. With a deceased mother, an adult plaintiff, a relatively well-off
and apparently dysfunctional family involved in an unsavory business, Lalli
lacked a similarly sympathetic factual situation. In any event, the four Justices
who dissented in Trimble were unlikely to want to strike down the New York
law. 344 Blackmun wrote wryly: “In this modern day, illegitimacy is of no
significance, apparently, and the popular thing would be to reverse.” 345
Blackmun wanted to uphold the law, though he “would not do so alone if all
the [other Trimble dissenters] give way.” 346
To Blackmun’s surprise, however, Powell voted to uphold the New York
law, believing that Trimble was distinguishable. 347 The remaining members of
the Trimble majority adhered to their earlier position. 348 As in Trimble,
Powell’s was the deciding vote in Lalli and Burger assigned him the opinion.
Powell framed the statute as concerned not with marital status or legitimacy,
but merely with the establishment of paternity to ensure the “just and orderly
disposition of property at death,” which was an “interest of considerable
magnitude.” 349 Unlike the statute in Trimble, New York’s law did not
absolutely bar illegitimate children from inheritance. 350
Even if Lalli had come out the other way, the case seemed a flawed
vehicle for a sex discrimination ruling. As several clerks observed, Robert
Lalli’s mother was no longer alive, much less a party to the case. 351 The clerks
also doubted whether any sex discrimination claim had been raised below,
though Jane Greengold Stevens had coauthored an amicus brief making sex
equality arguments to the high Court. 352 Clerk Eric Anderson recommended to
Powell “that the Court not get into the sex discrimination issues,” and Powell
344. Memorandum, Justice Blackmun, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli, at 9, collected in Blackmun
Papers, Box 283, Folder 9.
345. Id. at 10.
346. Id.
347. Justice Stevens disagreed, writing to Powell of “not wanting to retreat from the Court’s
fine opinion in Trimble.” Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli
(Nov. 14, 1978), collected in Powell papers.
348. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275–77 (1978) (Stewart, J. concurring).
349. Id. at 268 (Powell, J.). Burger asked Powell to call it “an interest of the highest order.”
Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli (Nov. 30, 1978),
collected in Powell Papers.
350. Blackmun’s brief concurring opinion called Trimble a “derelict,” a characterization that
Stewart’s concurrence disputed. Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dissenters worried that
requiring an official paternity determination penalized children of fathers who voluntarily supported
them, thus obviating the need for a formal order of filiation. Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
351. Bench Memorandum from Gary Sasso to Justice White, collected in White Papers, Box
436, Folder 5; Preliminary Memorandum from Michael Sundermeyer, No. 77-1115-ASX, Lalli v.
Lalli (Mar. 6, 1978), at 5, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 283, Folder 9 (noting that “A DWSFQ
w[oul]d be consistent with your votes in Trimble and Labine”); Bench Memorandum from Eric
Anderson to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli (Sept. 29, 1978), collected in Powell Papers.
The party opposing Robert Lalli’s inheritance was Mario’s legal widow, Rosamond Lalli. Lalli, 439
U.S. at 261.
352. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Legal Aid Society of New York City and Legal Services
of the Elderly Poor in Support of Appellant at 22–28, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (No. 77-1115).
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agreed. 353 As the last in the line of intestacy cases that came before the Court in
the 1970s, Lalli seemed at best an emblem of the Justices’ vacillation, at worst,
a retreat from the principles that had intermittently animated the illegitimacy
cases.
3. “Neither Illogical Nor Unjust”: Parham v. Hughes, 1979
“Sex discrimination issues” could not be avoided in Parham v. Hughes. 354
When a tragic automobile accident killed six-year-old Lemuel Parham and his
mother, Cassandra Moreen, his father Curtis Parham did as Minnie Brade
Glona had done a decade earlier: sued for his son’s wrongful death. 355 Parham
did not live with Lemuel and his mother, but he was deeply involved in the
boy’s life, providing financial support, visiting him daily, and taking care of
Lemuel at home on many weekends. 356 Under Georgia law, a mother could sue
for the wrongful death of a nonmarital child regardless of his legitimacy.
Fathers, in contrast, were required to have legitimated their children in order to
file such an action. 357 Parham had signed his son’s birth certificate but had not
completed the required legitimation paperwork. 358 The Georgia Supreme Court
upheld the statutory exclusion against his due process and equal protection
challenge, distinguishing Glona. 359
By the time Parham reached the Supreme Court, some observers
despaired of discerning a consistent pattern in the Justices’ treatment of
illegitimacy-based classifications. Clerk Albert Lauber wrote to Blackmun:
“Quite frankly, I must confess that trying to reconcile all these cases is the most
difficult task I have faced in my tenure as a law clerk.” 360 Blackmun’s own
votes were a mixed bag; Powell, too, appeared to vacillate. Powell had written
florid opinions striking down illegitimacy penalties as inimical to the principle
that “hapless” children should not suffer for their parents’ “irresponsible
liaisons”; 361 he had also authored and joined relatively bloodless decisions
upholding illegitimacy classifications as rationally related to legitimate

353. Bench Memorandum from Eric Anderson to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli
(Sept. 29, 1978), collected in Powell Papers. Next to this sentence in Anderson’s bench memo, Powell
wrote, “Yes.” Id. at 8.
354. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
355. Parham v. Hughes, No. 5643-C (Ga. Super. Ct. Cnty. Richmond Sep. 13, 1977), reprinted
in Appendix at 3, Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (No. 78-3); see also Parham, 441 U.S. at 349.
356. Parham v. Hughes, No. 5643-C (Ga. Super. Ct. Cnty. Richmond Sep. 13, 1977), reprinted
in Appendix at 3, Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (No. 78-3).
357. Parham, 441 U.S. at 348–49.
358. Id. at 349.
359. Hughes v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 867, 871 (Ga. 1978), aff’d, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
360. Preliminary Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber to Justice Blackmun, Parham v.
Hughes, No. 78-3 (Mar. 1, 1979), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 291, Folder 2.
361. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972).
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government interests in preventing fraudulent and spurious claims of
paternity. 362
Framing Parham as primarily a sex discrimination case provided one way
to avoid this morass. At conference, Brennan and Marshall, reliable votes for
illegitimacy plaintiffs, took this approach, and White agreed. Blackmun
remained ambivalent; he drafted and considered filing a separate dissent in
Parham attempting to make sense of his (and the Court’s) seemingly
contradictory positions in illegitimacy cases. 363 After writing several agonized
memos on the subject, clerk Lauber concluded that the best way to reconcile
Blackmun’s votes in the illegitimacy cases was to say that he “ha[d] much
more difficulty with gender-based classifications than with illegitimacy-based
classifications.” 364
In the end, though, Stewart’s plurality opinion sidestepped both the
illegitimacy and the sex discrimination questions presented by Parham. The
challenged law, he declared, simply did not reflect “invidious discrimination”
and therefore warranted no special scrutiny. 365 Parham epitomized the
underside of the child-centered account of illegitimacy penalties’ harm: quoting
the familiar “hapless and innocent children” passage from Weber, Stewart
wrote that the “basic rationale” of the illegitimacy decisions was that it was
“unjust and ineffective for society to express its condemnation of procreation
outside the marital relationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is in no
way responsible for his situation and is unable to change it.” 366 In contrast, he
declared, it was “neither illogical nor unjust for society to express its
‘condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage’ by not
conferring upon a biological father the statutory right to sue for the wrongful
death of his illegitimate child.” 367 When a statute affected the rights of fathers
362. Sometimes on the same day, as in Trimble and Fiallo, and in Parham and Caban v.
Mohammed. Compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (Powell, J.) (striking down Illinois
intestacy law excluding illegitimate children from paternal inheritance on April 26, 1977), with Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Powell, J.) (upholding immigration laws classifying based on sex and
illegitimacy on April 26, 1977); compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (Powell, J.)
(invalidating stepfather adoption where biological father had lived with and raised “illegitimate”
children on April 24, 1979), with Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (Stewart, J.) (upholding
Georgia wrongful death law precluding nonmarital fathers from recovering in the absence of
“legitimation” on April 24, 1979). Some of the Justices were relatively consistent in their votes, with
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall always supporting the plaintiffs, and Rehnquist a reliable vote for the
defendants. Burger and Stewart had voted for the plaintiffs in some of the early cases, but beginning in
1976, they always sided with defendants.
363. Various versions of his draft dissent, never filed, suggested that Blackmun had
distinguished between three categories of cases—inheritance, non-inheritance, and federal welfare
statutes. Draft dissent, Parham v. Hughes (No. 78-3), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 291, Folder
2.
364. Preliminary Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber to Justice Blackmun, Parham v.
Hughes, No. 78-3 (Mar. 1, 1979), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 291, Folder 2.
365. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979).
366. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
367. Id. at 353.
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only, “[t]he justifications for judicial sensitivity to the constitutionality of
differing legislative treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children are simply
absent.” 368 As for the alleged sex discrimination, Stewart interpreted the
Court’s earlier cases as applying only to circumstances in which men and
women were “similarly situated.” 369 Here, he insisted, they were not: under
Georgia law, only a father could unilaterally legitimate a child. Moreover,
whereas unmarried mothers were easily identifiable, fathers’ identity “will
frequently be unknown.” 370
Powell provided a fifth vote to uphold the Georgia statute, though he
Justice White, whose opinion in Stanley v.
concurred separately. 371
Illinois several years earlier had ushered in a new era of limited parental rights
for nonmarital fathers, wrote a strongly worded dissent condemning the
plurality’s failure to see the constitutional harm suffered by Curtis Parham.
“What we said in Glona about unmarried mothers,” White insisted, “applies
equally to unmarried fathers.” 372 Of course, the significance of what the Court
said in Glona about unmarried mothers was deeply contested and far from
clear. 373 In any event, the Parham plurality opinion strongly suggested that
little more than a decade later, many Justices interpreted Glona narrowly
indeed.
4. “High Court Rules Against Unwed Mothers”: Califano v. Boles, 1979
At the decade’s close, an unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the
exclusion of unwed parents from “mothers’ insurance” benefits starkly
spotlighted the limitations of illegitimacy jurisprudence’s challenge to marital
supremacy and sex inequality. Margaret Gonzales and Norman W. Boles lived
together unmarried in Georgetown, Texas, between 1963 and 1966. 374 Their
son, Norman J. Boles, was born in 1964. 375 In 1967, Norman Sr. returned to
Tennessee and married a woman who bore him two sons. 376 When Norman Sr.
died in 1971, all three of the Boles children received children’s insurance
benefits, but Gonzales’s application for mothers’ insurance benefits was
denied. 377 Only Nancy Boles, Norman’s legal widow, was eligible for mothers’
benefits under the Social Security Act. 378 With the help of Texas Legal Aid
lawyers and attorneys from the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) in
368. Id.
369. Id. at 354.
370. Id. at 355.
371. Powell’s concurrence upheld the statute’s sex-based classification under the intermediate
scrutiny standard. Id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
372. Id. at 363 (White, J., dissenting).
373. See supra notes 92–103 and accompanying text.
374. Boles v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 408, 410 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
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Washington, D.C., Gonzales and Norman Jr. filed a class action lawsuit in
1974 on behalf of all similarly situated unmarried mothers and nonmarital
children. 379 The plaintiffs’ attorney in the Supreme Court, Herbert Semmel of
CLASP, had long eyed this statutory exclusion: in 1969, he had suggested that
Glona might be read to invalidate it. 380
When the Boles litigation began, only mothers married to wage earners
were eligible for so-called “mothers’ insurance” benefits when a father died. 381
In 1975, the Supreme Court ruled in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld that excluding
widowed fathers from these benefits violated equal protection. 382 For the Boles
plaintiffs in particular, Wiesenfeld seemed like a godsend. Litigants and judges
alike agreed that the determinative question was whether the primary intended
beneficiaries of the mothers’ insurance program were mothers themselves or
their children. If the provision was aimed at children, then excluding mothers
who had never married the wage-earning father seemed like unconstitutional
discrimination against illegitimate children, plain and simple.
The Boles plaintiffs argued that children were the primary intended
beneficiaries, and federal district court Judge Jack Roberts agreed. Roberts
found that “Mother’s Benefits are not related to an obligation to support the
mother but rather stem from the statutory purpose to assist the children” by
“allow[ing] the surviving child of a deceased worker to receive the care of its
surviving parent, relieving at least to some extent the necessity of the surviving
parent to leave the child and go to work.” 383 Roberts granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs, calling the mothers’ benefit exclusion “the classic
case of visiting the sins of the parents on the child.” 384
If mothers’ benefits truly were children’s benefits by another name, Boles
was an easy case. But if, as the federal government maintained, mothers—
parents, after Wiesenfeld—were the intended beneficiaries, matters became

379. See id.
380. See Semmel, supra note 88, at 300 (“Approached from the perspective of the mother of an
illegitimate, Glona can be read to assert that a mother cannot be denied a benefit based on a
relationship to her illegitimate child which is afforded mothers of legitimates. . . . The class of persons
receiving benefits are mothers of the deceased children and Congress may not constitutionally
discriminate within such a class solely on the basis of whether the mother ever entered into a formal
marriage with the father.”).
381. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (extending the benefit to fathers).
382. The decision in Wiesenfeld, see supra note 277 and accompanying text, provided a
promising precedent for sex-discriminatory illegitimacy classifications like those challenged in the
intestacy cases, because it invalidated discrimination against children based on the sex of their
surviving parent. The child-centered language of Wiesenfeld also seemed a boon to illegitimacy
plaintiffs generally. See 420 U.S. at 652.
383. Boles v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 408, 411 (W.D. Tex. 1978), rev’d, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
The Social Security Act had, until 1965, excluded illegitimate children from all benefits. Thereafter,
Roberts wrote, “Congress included illegitimate children but hedged their benefits with a series of
discriminatory provisions,” most of which the Supreme Court had already deemed unconstitutional by
the late 1970s. Id. at 417.
384. Id. at 413.
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much more complicated. The government argued that Congress had merely
used marriage as a proxy for economic dependence, intending to replace
support lost upon a wage-earner’s death. 385 It was perfectly reasonable to
assume that unmarried mothers were “significantly less likely to have been
dependent on the wage-earner.” 386 Indeed, the government pointed out, if an
unmarried father “did not choose voluntarily to support the unmarried mother,
in most states she had no legal recourse to compel him to do so.” 387 As
Assistant Solicitor General Harriet Shapiro 388 told the Court, “The theory
behind mothers’ benefits is that a wife with an entitled child in her care should
have the same option that she had before her husband’s death. That is, either to
stay home, supported by her husband to take care of the children, or else to
work and help to support the family.” 389 The vast majority of never-married
mothers had never had such a choice—at least not by virtue of marriage to their
children’s father.
The Court had made clear in earlier Social Security cases that the
government could not use parental marital status—illegitimacy—as a proxy for
a child’s dependency or lack thereof. 390 In other words, an illegitimate child
could not be denied benefits outright on the assumption that she did not depend
upon her parent for support; at the very least, the child must be afforded the
opportunity to prove dependency. But in a series of cases decided in the mid1970s, the Court held that for adults, marriage could be used as a shorthand for
dependency. In 1976, the Court unanimously held that Congress could cut off
disability benefits to an individual who married someone ineligible for such
benefits, because the government could assume that a married person could
depend upon his or her spouse for support. 391 The same year, the Justices
upheld the exclusion of divorced women under age sixty-two from certain
Social Security benefits available to similarly situated married women, finding
it reasonable to assume that ex-spouses were less likely to be dependent than
married couples. 392 Since marriage was a legitimate proxy for adults’
dependency, the government argued in Boles, restricting Social Security

385. Brief for Appellant at 10, Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (No. 78-808) 1979 WL
213898.
386. Id. at 11.
387. Id. at 16.
388. On Shapiro, see Clare Cushman, Women Advocates Before the Supreme Court, 26 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 67, 73 (2001), http://supremecourthistory.org/assets/pub_journal_2001_vol_1.pdf.
389. Transcript of Oral Argument, Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979)
(No. 78-808), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_808.
390. See Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1971), summarily aff’d, 409 U.S.
1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972), summarily aff’d, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972).
391. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S 47 (1977).
392. Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976); see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975).
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benefits to parents who had married the family wage-earner posed no
constitutional problem. 393
At first, it seemed as if the child-focused view of the case would prevail in
the Supreme Court. Jack Pratt, clerk to Chief Justice Burger, wrote confidently
in his “cert pool memo” that the district court was correct, 394 and at first, a
majority of the Justices agreed. 395 But what had begun as a narrow victory for
the plaintiffs became a five-to-four decision against them, authored by the
Court’s foremost opponent of illegitimacy plaintiffs, Justice Rehnquist.
Rehnquist was the only Justice with a more or less consistently
conservative record in both sex- and illegitimacy-based discrimination cases. 396
The rare exception was Wiesenfeld, where—ironically—Rehnquist had
concurred separately to underscore his belief that the “only purpose of [the
mother’s insurance program] is to make it possible for children of deceased
contributing workers to have the personal care and attention of the surviving
parent.” 397 In Boles, Rehnquist did an about-face. His majority opinion
accepted the government’s view that the “benefit to a child as a result of the

393. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 385, at 12–17.
394. Bench Memorandum from Bill McDaniel, Jr., for Justice Blackmun, No. 78-808, Califano
v. Boles (Apr. 18, 1979), at 25, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 296, Folder 10. The government,
Pratt declared, “focuses on the wrong relationship: once it is conceded that the statute seeks to benefit
children, the economic dependency of the mother is irrelevant,” and so were the cases upholding
marriage as a proxy for adult dependency. Preliminary Memorandum from Jack Pratt to Justice
Blackmun, No. 78-808-ADX, Califano v. Boles (Jan. 14, 1979), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box
296, Folder 10. Blackmun (often a swing vote in illegitimacy cases) and his clerks agreed with Pratt’s
assessment.
395. See Bench Memorandum from Bill McDaniel, Jr., for Justice Blackmun, No. 78-808,
Califano v. Boles (April 18, 1979), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 296, Folder 10; Preliminary
Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber to Justice Blackmun, No. 78-808-ADX, Califano v. Boles (Jan.
14, 1979), at 7–8, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 296, Folder 10 (memo typed by Jack Pratt at end
of Preliminary Memo). At conference, Burger indicated that he would vote to uphold the district court
decision; even with Powell on the fence, the Chief Justice’s vote secured a majority for the plaintiffs.
See Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Conference, No. 78-808, Califano v. Boles (Apr. 27,
1979), collected in Powell Papers. But that majority unraveled by the following day, as first Burger
and then Powell decided to vote for reversal. See id.
396. Rehnquist had dissented from two otherwise unanimous 1973 rulings: Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), see supra note 12 and accompanying text, and New Jersey Welfare
Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), which held unconstitutional a state requirement
that couples be “ceremonially married” and living with one common child in order to receive certain
welfare benefits. In Cahill, Rehnquist wrote that “ceremonial marriage that could quite reasonably be
found to be an essential ingredient of the family unit that the . . . Legislature is trying to protect from
dissolution . . . .” 411 U.S. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Whereas in earlier illegitimacy cases, “a
disability was visited solely on an illegitimate child,” in Cahill “the statute distinguishe[d] among
types of families,” so that “whatever denial of benefits the classification makes is imposed equally on
the parents as well as the children.” Id. By the late 1970s, the only reliable majority in these cases
consisted of swing Justices who might vote either way depending upon the case. Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Stewart and, to a lesser extent, Stevens and White all fell into this category. Justices Brennan
and Marshall were the only consistent liberal votes in both sets of cases.
397. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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parent or guardian’s receipt of mother’s insurance benefits” was merely
“incidental.” 398
Blackmun clerk Bill McDaniel reacted indignantly to Rehnquist’s first
draft. Rehnquist had tried to undercut Wiesenfeld’s impact on sex equality law
by focusing on children, and now, “his position has come back to haunt
him.” 399 In order “to avoid a result that would benefit illegitimates,” McDaniel
wrote, “he now retreats from his former avowed position. I do not find this
convincing,” the clerk fumed. “I do find it unseemly.” 400
Justice Marshall’s dissent, too, excoriated Rehnquist’s—and the
Court’s—reinterpretation of statutory purpose. Moreover, his opinion, joined
by Brennan, Blackmun, and White, disputed the majority’s view that the
“discriminatory impact on illegitimates” did not pose any constitutional
problem. In past cases, the fact that illegitimate children were not wholly
excluded from benefits had not stopped the Court from finding an equal
protection violation. Marshall lamented the Court’s “imprimatur” for a
distinction “needlessly predicated on a disfavored social status” that was
“beyond an individual’s power to affect.” 401
Notably, though, despite their vehement disagreement over the proper
resolution of the case, the Boles litigants and Justices all agreed that victory for
the plaintiffs hinged upon reading the mother’s insurance program as primarily
benefiting children, rather than parents. None of the court documents so much
as suggested that unmarried mothers themselves might have a constitutional
claim against exclusion from the statutory scheme.
In some ways, this elision is unsurprising. After all, the Court had recently
held that marriage was a constitutionally legitimate proxy for dependency. 402
But none of the earlier cases implicated a distinction between married and
never-married mothers. The previous Social Security cases, Jimenez and Lucas,
had not made sex discrimination arguments either, but such arguments had
become common in the most recent cases concerning intestacy and
employment discrimination against unmarried mothers. Boles did not clearly
implicate a purely sex-based classification, since married mothers received
benefits, but other cases had framed discrimination against unwed mothers as
sex discrimination. 403 Privacy and liberty arguments were available as well: a
student note published shortly after the Boles decision suggested that the

398. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 294 (1979).
399. Memorandum from Bill McDaniel, Jr., to Justice Blackmun, No. 78-808, Califano v.
Boles (June 2, 1979), at 1–2, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 296, Folder 10.
400. Id. at 2.
401. Boles, 443 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall concluded: “Although a
‘blanket and conclusive exclusion’ of illegitimate children may be an administratively expedient
means of screening for dependence . . . it is also inaccurate, unjust, and, under this Court’s settled
precedents, unconstitutional.” Id.
402. See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
403. See discussions of Andrews, Fernandez, Trimble, and Lalli, supra, Part II.
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challenged statute unconstitutionally infringed upon mothers’ “fundamental
right” to choose not to marry. 404
By the late 1970s, influential feminists and constitutional scholars had
highlighted the connection between “illegitimacy,” reproductive freedom, and
sex equality. 405 Certainly, the Boles statute’s detrimental impact on unmarried
mothers was no mystery. The Washington Post headline after the Boles
decision proclaimed, “High Court Rules, 5 to 4, Against Unwed Mothers.” 406
As Social Security manager Richard Hyde put it:
We read that couples living together outside of marriage is a growing
trend. Maybe it’s all part of the woman’s liberation and equal rights
movements. But one must wonder if a girl considering such an
arrangement ever thinks about the absence of equal risks—the risks all
seem to be on her side. If you don’t believe this—ask Margaret
Gonzales. 407
III.
ILLEGITIMACY, INEQUALITY, AND THE LEGACIES OF MARITAL SUPREMACY
The illegitimacy cases changed the law in important ways. Whatever the
limitations of the Court’s reasoning, the act of striking down most distinctions
between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children meant that many nonmarital
families enjoyed greater protection from legal disabilities such as children’s
inability to inherit or obtain child support from fathers, and that nonmarital
children received government benefits from which they had long been
excluded. By extension, these rule changes benefited (some) parents of
nonmarital children and made the world safer for nonmarital sex and
childbearing, even if their underlying rhetoric and rationale were less
progressive than they might have been.
These changes occurred against a backdrop of political tumult that
provided both opportunities and constraints for opponents of illegitimacy
penalties. In the mid- to late-1960s, anti-poverty and civil rights lawyers seized
the opening offered by the Warren Court’s civil rights jurisprudence to make
race and wealth equality arguments against laws that disadvantaged nonmarital
families. The political obstacles to normalizing nonmarital sex, childbearing,
and family formation were formidable even—or perhaps especially—in the
heyday of Great Society liberalism. For many liberals and civil rights leaders,
“illegitimacy” remained a scourge, threatening to sabotage racial progress by
404. Barbara Levitan, Comment, Califano v. Boles: Unequal Protection for Illegitimate
Children and their Mothers, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 241, 243, 266 (1979).
405. For two prominent examples, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution,
52 TUL. L. REV. 451, 459 (1978); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57–58 & n.320 (1977).
406. High Court Rules, 5 to 4, Against Unwed Mothers, WASH. POST, June 28, 1979, at A4.
407. Richard D. Hyde, Living Together Has Its Risks When It Comes to Death Benefits, FREE
LANCE-STAR (Fredericksburg, Va.), Aug. 27, 1979, at 5.
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undermining the male breadwinner ideal and contributing to the “tangle of
pathology” inherent in “matriarchal” family structure. 408 For conservatives and
many Southern “moderates,” moral regulations, including illegitimacy
penalties, had become a convenient way to resist desegregation and shore up
racial hierarchy after the demise of de jure racial discrimination. 409
By the early 1970s, feminists and their allies could capitalize on the
women’s movement’s increasing political salience and on emerging sex
equality precedents to highlight the distinctive harms illegitimacy penalties
imposed on women. Soon after feminists unseated “breadwinner liberalism” as
the reigning ideology undergirding progressive social policy, however, the
ascendancy of a countermovement committed to “breadwinner conservatism”
reconfigured the old constraints. 410 Nixon’s Court appointments replaced two
liberals on illegitimacy cases (Warren and Fortas) and two dissenters from
Levy/Glona (Harlan and Black) with two conservatives (Burger and Rehnquist)
and two swing voters (Powell and Blackmun). Feminists became entrenched in
an unexpectedly lengthy and unsuccessful battle over the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA); though they achieved significant change through the
courts, their efforts ran aground precisely in areas most salient to reproduction
and the primacy of marital families. 411
For understandable reasons, then, advocates did not deploy the full arsenal
of feminist challenges to illegitimacy penalties in court. They did not, for
instance, directly question the privatization of dependency within the nuclear
family. Even Andrews, which celebrated women’s economic autonomy from
men, depicted the plaintiffs as engaged in an admirable quest for independence
from public assistance, for self-sufficiency through market work. Advocates in
the other illegitimacy cases often mentioned the irrationality of neglecting
available private sources of support and thus increasing public welfare
expenditures.
It is also true that no feminist organization prioritized the illegitimacy
cases or launched a concerted campaign on behalf of unmarried mothers in
particular. 412 Many aspects of feminists’ legal agenda during this period

408. See Mayeri, supra note 26, and sources on the Moynihan Report cited therein; see also
MOYNIHAN, supra note 26, at 8–9, 29–37.
409. See generally WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW, supra note 29. See also supra Part II.
410. I borrow these terms from Robert O. Self’s compelling synthetic history of this period,
ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE THE 1960S (2012).
411. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). On the achievements and
limits of feminist legal advocacy in the 1970s, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12.
412. Feminist organizations’ involvement in the cases discussed here was not insignificant.
Ginsburg attempted to persuade her colleagues to allow the ACLU WRP to file an amicus brief in
Fiallo v. Bell, see supra notes 323–329 and accompanying text. The WRP also reviewed Frank
Cochran’s early submissions in Roe v. Norton. See Supplement to Jurisdictional Statement, Roe v.
Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1974) (No. 73-6033), collected in ACLU Records, Mudd Library, Princeton
University, Box 2833, Folder: Roe v. Norton; Memorandum including Frank Cochran’s proposed
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encompassed women regardless of marital status: reproductive freedom, the
campaign against employment discrimination generally, and pregnancy
discrimination in particular, to name a few. In part, the failure to foreground
illegitimacy penalties likely reflected ambivalence among some feminist
strategists about the wisdom of placing unwed parents at the center of feminist
litigation campaigns. Attacking male supremacy within marriage—which
loomed large on the agenda of leading feminist legal advocates 413—posed a
fairly radical challenge to American law and social life. Challenging marital
supremacy in a political environment where feminists stood accused by ERA
opponents of assaulting traditional marriage and family relationships likely
seemed impolitic. 414 Courtroom advocates in particular were acutely aware of
their audience and of the generational norms that made even otherwise liberal
judges like Justice Brennan balk at much tamer feminist claims about the
normative ideals of family life. 415
Communities in which nonmarital childbearing was prevalent were
themselves divided over the wisdom of fighting for “unwed mothers’” rights:
Katie Mae Andrews’s lawyer, Charles Victor McTeer, for instance, recalls
sharp divisions within Drew, Mississippi’s, African American community over
her case. 416 Andrews and her co-plaintiff Lestine Rogers presented themselves
as responsible, religious women who had made a mistake born of ignorance
and lack of access to contraception, not as champions of sexual liberty or
flouters of marriage. 417 The testimony in Andrews revealed some dissension
about the moral valence of nonmarital sex, however. When questioned about
how she would counsel a student who asked whether she should engage in
sexual intercourse, teacher’s aide applicant Viola Burnett replied that she saw
no harm in it, and would advise her pupils to do as they pleased. 418
Philadelphia activist and plaintiff Lois Fernandez owned her decision to
become a single mother as a choice she made with pride and without regrets. 419

outline for brief, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (No. 73-6033), collected in ACLU Records, Box 4430,
Folder: Roe v. Norton (privacy). And the WRP joined Equal Rights Advocates in filing a strong
feminist amicus brief in Andrews v. Drew. As discussed supra Part II, feminists within organizations
with a broader civil rights or legal services focus also played important roles in these cases.
413. See Mayeri, “The First Order of Business”: Feminists Challenge Male Supremacy in
Marriage, supra note 12.
414. On the 1970s ERA debate, see, for example, Siegel, supra note 411; see also Serena
Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution of Feminism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1223 (2009) and sources cited therein.
415. On Justice Brennan’s evolving views on women, feminism, sex equality, and female law
clerks, see SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 315–16,
386–408 (2010).
416. Telephone Interview with Charles Victor McTeer (Aug. 2012).
417. Indeed, Andrews married in the mid-1970s and worked as a teacher and librarian in the
Mississippi public schools for four decades. MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 235.
418. Brief for Petitioners at 29, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559
(1976) (No. 74-1318), 1978 WL 173528.
419. See Fernandez, supra note 234; Wilson, supra note 234.
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The illegitimacy cases were not the product of a concerted or centralized
litigation campaign. Though some advocates and organizations became
interested and involved in multiple cases, their participation tended to occur
more by happenstance than by design. Moreover, counsel and allies of
illegitimacy plaintiffs ran the ideological gamut from Moynihanian reformers
such as Harry Krause, 420 to civil libertarians like Norman Dorsen and his
protégés, 421 to legal aid lawyers like Jane Greengold Stevens, 422 to activists
primarily motivated by feminism—even fairly radical feminism, at least by the
standards of 1970s feminist lawyering. 423
Even the more progressive civil libertarians and feminists moderated their
most innovative arguments in court. The challenge posed by the illegitimacy
cases to marital supremacy was significantly more limited than the broadest
feminist attacks on illegitimacy penalties articulated by young activists such as
Wallach and Tenoso. Advocates understandably hesitated to question directly
the states’ prerogative to promote traditional family relationships, or to deter
illicit sexual behavior, especially when doing so was unnecessary—and
perhaps counterproductive—to overturning discriminatory laws. They never
420. For Krause’s views on the Moynihan Report and the “social problem of illegitimacy,” see
e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 20, ch. 8.
421. On the more expansive sexual privacy arguments advanced by Dorsen and his students
Chip Gray and David Rudovsky, see supra notes 93–103 and accompanying text. On Martin Garbus’s
sexual privacy arguments in King v. Smith, see supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
422. Stevens recalls perceiving Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), the first
illegitimacy case she litigated, as primarily concerning the rights of children. Later, she made sex
equality arguments in Trimble v. Gordon and as amicus in Lalli v. Lalli, but although she identified
strongly as a feminist, she made her name as an advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities.
Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 281. Herbert Semmel (Califano v. Boles), Frank
Cochran (Roe v. Norton), James Weill (Trimble v. Gordon), all had distinguished careers in public
interest law but were not primarily identified with feminism. Semmel, for a time a colleague of
Krause’s at the University of Illinois, disagreed with some aspects of Krause’s approach. Compare,
e.g., Carol B. Stack & Herbert Semmel, The Concept of Family in the Poor Black Community, in
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE,
PAPER NO. 12 (PART II): THE FAMILY, POVERTY AND WELFARE PROGRAMS—HOUSEHOLD
PATTERNS AND GOVERNMENT 275 (Joint Comm. Print 1973) (arguing against rigorous child support
enforcement against poor black fathers), with Harry D. Krause, Child Welfare, Parental
Responsibility, and the State, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER NO. 12 (PART II), supra, at 255
(arguing that morality and fiscal responsibility required more rigorous child support enforcement). On
Semmel’s life, see Herbert Semmel, 73, Lawyer in Civil Rights Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004.
423.
Nancy Stearns and Rhonda Copelon, the lawyers at the CCR who became involved in
the Andrews case, were active in early reproductive rights and reproductive justice advocacy and
went on to become important feminist litigators and activists. Ann Freedman, whose Women’s
Law Project collaborated with Philadelphia’s Community Legal Services to argue Fernandez v.
Shapp, played an important role in 1970s legal advocacy and coauthored foundational feminist
legal texts. On Stearns, see, e.g., BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION
DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 376 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2012). On Copelon, see, e.g., Dennis Helvesi, Rhonda Copelon, Lawyer in Groundbreaking
Rights Cases, Dies at 65, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010. On Freedman, see, e.g., Barbara A. Brown et
al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871 (1971) (co-authored by Ann Freedman); BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET AL., SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975) (same).
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argued in court that women (or men) had a constitutional right to engage in
nonmarital sex, though notably, they did contend that women’s reproductive
autonomy should include the right to bear nonmarital children as well as the
prerogative to terminate a pregnancy. 424 Notwithstanding these limitations,
imposed under considerable political constraints, courtroom advocates
advanced a much more capacious account of what was wrong with illegitimacy
penalties than judicial opinions ever made visible.
Despite their efforts, by the end of the 1970s, the child-focused view of
illegitimacy’s harm had prevailed. Adults could be sanctioned for immorality,
but innocent children should not suffer needlessly for their parents’
transgressions. Marriage alone could be a proxy for adults’ dependency, even
when it would no longer suffice as a measure of children’s needs. Courts
scrutinized the relationship between means and ends, but ultimately upheld the
government’s interest in discouraging nonmarital sex, cohabitation or
childbearing, and in encouraging marriage and legitimate family
relationships. 425 Marital supremacy remained alive and well, and the formal sex
neutrality now required for married couples did not extend to nonmarital
partners or unmarried parents. Further, illegitimacy jurisprudence conveyed the
impression that sex, race, and illegitimacy were separate, non-overlapping
categories—suitable for purposes of (often unfavorable) comparison but not for
illuminating their mutually reinforcing and deeply intertwined character.
Why did arguments against sex inequality and marital supremacy make so
little headway in the illegitimacy cases? One reason was inauspicious timing in
a changing political environment. The early entrenchment of the child-focused
approach in the years before feminist legal advocates began to win
constitutional cases in the Supreme Court and the Court’s increasingly
conservative composition in the years thereafter meant that the Justices’
collective appetite for liberal innovations declined just as feminist momentum
accelerated. Advocates such as Norman Dorsen and Sylvia Law later became
champions of sex equality, but even had they been inclined to make such
arguments when they strategized about the first illegitimacy cases in 1967, they
would have had little doctrinal ammunition. 426 Even Weber preceded the
Court’s first deep consideration of sex equality under the equal protection
clause in Frontiero v. Richardson by several months, and Justices Powell and

424. See supra notes 242–47 and accompanying text.
425. Notably, feminists and other progressive critics were not the only observers to see the
Court’s illegitimacy decisions as essentially conservative. See, e.g., Samuel A. Alito, Equal Protection
and Classifications Based on Family Membership, 80 DICK. L. REV. 410 (1976); Bruce C. Hafen, The
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983).
426. Also, by the mid-twentieth century, most states had reformed their laws to recognize
mother-child relationships regardless of marital status, so that they incorporated sex-based as well as
illegitimacy-based classifications, but the Louisiana laws challenged in the early cases (Levy, Glona,
Labine, and Weber) did not.
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Rehnquist joined the Court too late to take part in Stanley v. Illinois or Reed v.
Reed. 427 Moreover, the Court’s personnel changes, underwritten by electoral
and cultural shifts, meant that the outcomes in 1970s illegitimacy cases would
largely be determined by swing Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stewart.
Procedural obstacles with substantive subtexts also plagued illegitimacy
plaintiffs. In Linda R.S., the challenge to a criminal non-support law that
exempted nonmarital fathers from liability, the Supreme Court ultimately
agreed with the federal district court majority’s holding that a mother and her
child lacked standing to challenge the state’s failure to prosecute unmarried
fathers. 428 In Gomez, the challenge to a similar exemption in Texas’s civil child
support law, Powell clerk William Kelly noted that there was “a sex
discrimination argument buried in this case . . . the mother but not the father
has a duty of support.” 429 But because it was not clear whether the Texas
statute explicitly required mothers to support their illegitimate children, Kelly
thought the sex discrimination claim was “not squarely presented.” 430
Indeed, skeptics often wondered whether sex discrimination claims were
properly before the Court in cases involving illegitimacy-based classifications.
These qualms reflected more than just procedural objections. In Trimble, for
instance, Blackmun privately thought the sex discrimination claim “pretty farfetched. Illegitimate children, male and female, are treated alike. That is where
the focus should be rather than on the parents.” 431 Moreover, Blackmun wrote
in an internal memo, “the classification between the mother and the father is a
legitimate one, according to our cases, for motherhood is exposed to public
view, whereas paternity of illegitimates is often a subject of spurious claims
and is difficult to prove.” 432
Blackmun also called the argument that mandatory paternity disclosure
involved a sex-based classification subject to heightened equal protection
scrutiny “spurious.” 433 Reflecting privately on Roe v. Norton, he wrote: “An
action to establish paternity must be brought by a woman, and that
classification cannot be avoided.” 434 He saw the classification as similar to the
one the Court had upheld in Geduldig v. Aiello (1974), where a majority of
Justices refused to characterize the exclusion of pregnancy from a California
427. For his part, Justice Blackmun joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Stanley v. Illinois.
405 U.S. 645, 659 (1972).
428. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
429. Memorandum from William C. Kelly, Jr., to Justice Powell, No. 71-575, Gomez v. Perez
& No. 71-6078 Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and Texas (Dec. 5, 1972), at 2, collected in Powell Papers.
430. Id.
431. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun, No. 75-5952, Trimble v. Gordon (Dec. 3, 1976), at
6, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 249, Folder 5.
432. Id.
433. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun, No. 73-6003, Roe v. Norton (Jan. 31, 1975), at 4,
collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 205 (“The secondary argument that the classification is based on
sex is spurious.”).
434. Id.
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disability insurance scheme as sex discriminatory. 435 Nor did Blackmun, or his
clerk, Moynihan protégé Richard Blumenthal, buy the plaintiffs’ argument that
reticent mothers had their children’s best interests at heart. 436
Notably, some judges did recognize the discriminatory impact of
illegitimacy penalties on women even before the Court decided its first
constitutional sex equality case. For instance, Texas state appellate Judge
Carlos Cadena, an accomplished civil rights attorney and scholar, wrote a
scathing dissent from his court’s decision in Gomez. 437 A legal pioneer and
founding member of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Cadena and his co-counsel had successfully argued the landmark case
Hernandez v. Texas (1954), which established that the Equal Protection Clause
protected not only African Americans but also other subordinated groups such
as Mexican Americans. 438 Cadena, the youngest of seven children of Mexican
immigrants, also knew something about the hardships of single motherhood.
Cadena’s parents separated when he was a child. His father returned to Mexico,
and his mother, who supported the family as a housekeeper and laundress,
conditioned her consent to a divorce on his pledge to pay for Carlos to attend
college. 439 Cadena later married a military widow with eight children, whom
they raised alongside one of his own. 440
In an opinion both scholarly and colorful, 441 Cadena ridiculed the notion
that refusing to hold unwed fathers responsible would serve the government
purpose of deterring illegitimacy. It could not, Cadena wrote, “be seriously
contended that the governmental purpose of promoting marriage and
discouraging sexual promiscuity is promoted by a rule which guarantees to the
rake immunity from liability for the support of the children born as a result of
his extramarital copulative performances.” 442 Nor was the cause of “family
unity” served by a law that exempted not only men with legitimate spouses and
children from support liability, but also unattached men. Beside, Cadena
remarked, it was “strange that the state shows no concern whatever for the
stability of the legitimate family of the illegitimate mother, on whom the State
of Texas places the obligation of support.” 443

435. Id.
436. See correspondence in Roe v. Norton file, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 205.
437. For more on Cadena, see Martin Donell Kohout, Cadena, Carlos Cristian (1917–2001),
TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASS’N (June 12, 2010), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/
articles/fcaas.
438. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
439. See Kohout, supra note 437.
440. See id.
441. G— v. P—, 466 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1971) (Cadena, J., dissenting), rev’d
sub nom. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). Cadena cited many of the major works of scholarship
on illegitimacy penalties, including those of Krause and Gray and Rudovsky. Id.
442. Id. at 45.
443. Id.
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In a footnote, Cadena posed a rhetorical question that Gomez’s lawyers
would pick up in their briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court: “May the illegitimate
mother complain that she is denied the equal protection of the laws because her
obligation[s] to her illegitimate child are substantially greater than those
imposed upon the man who was her partner in the socially disapproved
procreative act?” 444 Cadena’s Gomez dissent thus belies the notion that sex
equality arguments were unavailable or inaccessible to judges before the mid1970s, or that they were too difficult to see in cases apparently involving
illegitimacy rather than sex classifications.
To be sure, some cases presented mothers’ sex equality, privacy, and
reproductive autonomy claims more centrally than others. Cases involving
employment bans (Andrews), mandatory paternity disclosure (Norton), and
clear, facial sex-based classifications (Andrews, Fernandez) probably provided
the best opportunities for successful feminist arguments given their obvious
impact on women. None of these cases produced a Supreme Court opinion,
though Norton and Andrews were fully briefed and argued. The Justices at the
Court’s ideological center seemed relieved to avoid the thorny constitutional
questions these cases raised. 445 After the Court successfully dodged the sex
equality/illegitimacy nexus in Andrews and Trimble, the decade’s remaining
cases (Fiallo, Lalli, Boles) proved more difficult—though hardly hopeless—
vehicles for highlighting illegitimacy penalties’ burden on mothers.
Politically, child-focused arguments always had an edge over expansive
visions of sexual freedom, race and sex equality, and even privacy. One could
believe fervently in the sanctity of marriage and the traditional family, in the
immorality of nonmarital sex, and in the inviolability of privatized dependence
and nevertheless recoil at laws that punished “hapless and innocent” children
for circumstances utterly beyond their control. As the Court and the nation’s
political climate drifted to the right, consensus on issues of morality and
equality became ever more elusive. A focus on children allowed advocates and
courts to sidestep these thornier issues and unite behind the banner of
children’s welfare. 446
Appeals to children’s well being also conveniently underwrote more
pecuniary motivations. Support and inheritance rights for nonmarital children
helped to privatize their dependency, as did allowing them to receive workers’

444. G— v. P—, 406 S.W.2d at 45.
445. See supra Part II.C.1. Some advocates sensed this reluctance and sought advantage: Jim
Weill, co-counsel in Trimble, later recalled his hope that presenting a sex discrimination claim would
push the Justices to decide the case in the plaintiffs’ favor but on other grounds so as to sidestep the
fraught intersection between sex equality and illegitimacy penalties. Telephone Interview with James
Weill and Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 278.
446. Cf. Linda Greenhouse, What Would Justice Powell Do? The ‘Alien Children’ Case and the
Meaning of Equal Protection, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 29 (2008).
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compensation and to recover for the wrongful death of their parents. 447 Making
illegitimate children eligible for Social Security benefits eased the welfare
burden on states. Allowing unmarried mothers access to decent jobs saved on
public assistance costs. Privileging marriage, in other words, did not always
serve the cause of privatizing dependency. 448 And as these examples reflect,
most illegitimacy penalties could easily be framed as injurious to both women
and children. Mandatory paternity disclosure, by contrast, apparently pitted
mothers’ desire for privacy and autonomy against children’s right to a father’s
support and care. This supposed conflict motivated advocates to expose how
child-centered rationales obscured baser purposes: they accused supporters of
mandatory paternity disclosure of concealing “fiscal concerns” beneath a patina
of solicitude for children’s welfare. 449
Advocates had a larger arsenal of constitutional weapons at their disposal
by the mid-1970s. But the emerging jurisprudence of sex equality, sexual
privacy, and parental rights had its limitations. Many of the equal protection
cases won by feminists in the 1970s established the right of married couples to
pursue more egalitarian divisions of household and market labor, free of
government-imposed sex stereotypes. 450 Husbands and wives could no longer
be assumed by law to fall naturally into breadwinning and
caregiving/dependent roles. But many of the government benefits now
available to widowers as well as widows, marital families where wives were
primary breadwinners, and surviving fathers as well as mothers, remained
wholly unavailable to unmarried parents. The Court severely limited the
definition of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, exempting
discrimination based on pregnancy from constitutional censure and upholding
sex-based distinctions based on “real” differences. 451 And crucially, by the end

447. See Appleton, supra note 7, at 360 (noting that the Court’s illegitimacy decisions “offered
welcome changes for the state itself, paving the way for the increasing privatization of dependency”).
448. For a sampling of the literature on the relationship between government recognition of
families and the privatization of dependency past and present, see generally Ariela R. Dubler,
Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885
(1998); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2181 (1995); Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (2015);
Murray, supra note 7; Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1835 (2014).
449. Mandatory paternity disclosure divided opponents of illegitimacy-based classifications.
Some, like Krause, generally favored the requirement that mothers identify biological fathers, on the
ground that children deserved access to all possible sources of support. Others protested such rules as a
violation of women’s privacy, often arguing that mothers’ and children’s interests were ultimately one
and the same. See supra notes 260–69 and accompanying text.
450. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
451. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that pregnancy discrimination
was not sex discrimination under the equal protection clause).
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of the 1970s, a policy’s disparate impact on a disadvantaged group carried little
weight without proof of discriminatory intent. 452
The reasoning, if not the result, of the sexual privacy cases, too, fell short
of feminist ideals. 453 Apart from the well-known failure of Roe v. Wade to rely
on sex equality grounds for abortion rights, and Justice Douglas’s paean to the
“sanctity of the marital bedroom” in Griswold, these cases subtly reaffirmed
marital supremacy in other ways. Some supporters of decriminalizing
contraception for unmarried couples argued to the Court in Eisenstadt that the
tragic costs of “illegitimacy” could thus be avoided. 454 Roe v. Wade referred to
the “continuing stigma of unwed motherhood” as a justification for allowing
women to “consider” abortion “in consultation” with a “responsible
physician.” 455 Virtually no one even hinted, in any of these cases, that the state
could not constitutionally prohibit fornication. And the “unwed fathers” cases
tread cautiously in questioning the state’s ability to privilege marriage or to
distinguish between unmarried parents on the basis of sex. 456 Indeed, the
specter of equal rights for unmarried mothers and fathers cast a long shadow
over challenges to sex discrimination and marital supremacy in the 1970s and
beyond. 457
The Court’s rulings legalizing abortion and contraception yielded
important material advances in both liberty and equality, making nonmarital
sex less costly and allowing women greater economic and social as well as
sexual autonomy. When plaintiffs prevailed, the illegitimacy cases also
improved lives, granting access to benefits for “illegitimate” children that
assisted nonmarital children and, by extension, those responsible for their
support. But reasoning as well as results mattered. The Court’s reluctance to
address the constitutional implications of illegitimacy penalties for racial,
gender, and economic inequality, or for sexual privacy and liberty, meant that
even favorable statutory and regulatory developments remained vulnerable to
reversal. For instance, the failure to apply sex equality or sexual privacy and
liberty principles to mandatory paternity disclosure laws in the 1960s and
1970s left the door open to stringent requirements that enlisted welfare
recipients in state efforts to identify fathers and collect child support even after

452. See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, chs. 4–5.
453. For a contemporaneous reading of these cases as essentially conservative, see Thomas C.
Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1980) (arguing that
the contraception and abortion cases were “like the general run of the Court’s decisions in this area,
dedicated to the cause of social stability through the reinforcement of traditional institutions and have
nothing to do with the sexual liberation of the individual”).
454. See STEIN, supra note 103, at 118–19. But see Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel,
Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 349, 355–56 (2015) (recounting the
ACLU’s prescient 1965 interpretation of the equal protection clause as encompassing women’s right
to access contraception in order to achieve educational and economic equality).
455. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
456. See Murray, supra note 7; Davis, supra note 7.
457. See Mayeri, supra note 221.
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statutory entitlements to public assistance disappeared with the enactment of
welfare reform in the 1990s. 458
In other areas, statutory rights never materialized, leaving marital
privileges intact. For instance, while Congress and the courts extended to
nonmarital children some—though not all—Social Security benefits available
to legitimate children, unmarried parents never received the same courtesy.
Spousal benefits and benefits to formerly married parents became formally sexneutral, and divorced spouses gained somewhat greater protection. But
custodial parents (often mothers) who had not married their children’s wageearning parent (often fathers) never won the equal right to the “mothers’
insurance” benefits the Court extended to (married) fathers in Wiesenfeld. And,
of course, as contemporary marriage equality advocates remind us, thousands
of federal and state benefits follow marital status and remain unavailable to
non-spouses. 459
The focus on harm to children elided not only sex inequality, but racial
and economic injustice—just as nonmarital childbearing rates climbed among
low-income families, disproportionately people of color. Failing to question the
legal privileging of marriage as an instance of race-, gender-, and class-salient
harm obscured the pernicious effects of marital supremacy on the very groups
that could least afford to lose access to the benefits that accompany marriage.
Indeed, tying social supports to conjugal partnership, marital or not, meant that
many poor women and women of color suffered a double disadvantage because
they lacked partners likely to be eligible for employment-related benefits. Since
the 1970s, increasing economic inequality, high rates of incarceration, and
chronic unemployment have intersected with divergent marriage rates to
intensify the gap between highly educated women who could aspire to raise
their children in gender egalitarian partnerships with affluent male peers, and
their impoverished counterparts, who no longer could count on sharing the
burdens of raising children in poverty with a partner, much less rely on a
second income to escape its clutches.
Child-focused accounts of illegitimacy penalties’ harms endure, reflecting
marital supremacy’s resilience as well as the cross-cutting appeal of children as
political symbols. Justice Kennedy’s concern that depriving same-sex couples
of marital status “humiliates tens of thousands of children” is but one modern
iteration of an idiom that family law reformers have used to various ends for at
least two centuries. 460 Many who make child-focused arguments are sincere in
their concern for families’ welfare. Certainly, the relative success of these

458. On the 1996 welfare reform’s approach to mothers’ mandatory cooperation in paternity
establishment and related issues, see generally GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END (2002); ANNA
MARIE SMITH, WELFARE REFORM AND SEXUAL REGULATION (2007).
459. On federal benefits, see, for example, U.S. GOV’T GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (Jan. 23, 2004).
460. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
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claims in illegitimacy litigation confirms their considerable strategic
benefits. 461 But histories such as this remind us that embracing the trope of
innocent children at the expense of non-conforming adults’ equality, freedom,
and dignity carries a steep price—not only for adults, but for entire families. 462
CONCLUSION
A casual reader of the illegitimacy cases could be forgiven for thinking
that the laws they invalidated were mere relics of archaic common-law and
Victorian approaches to sexual morality. Certainly the punishment of blameless
children for the sins of their parents seemed “illogical and unjust” in the
modern era. But understanding the origins of these cases in the crucible of civil
rights activism, conservative reaction, and later, feminist advocacy, reveals
them less as anachronistic aberrations and more as part of a larger battle over
the relationship between family structure and racial, sexual, and economic
justice. The more expansive arguments advocates made, in and out of court,
about the relationship between illegitimacy penalties and other forms of
inequality remind us that judicial opinions often mask the real stakes of legal
and constitutional questions. If these advocates’ most capacious arguments had
succeeded, the stakes of marriage equality might not be so high, for marriage
might not be the exclusive path to family recognition and to social and
economic citizenship. Marriage equality advocates might have channeled
resources into other worthy battles without worrying that foregoing marriage
rights would deprive LGBT families of precious dignitary and material
benefits. 463 We might today have a constitutional politics that challenges not
only the exclusion of same-sex couples or inequities between spouses, but also
the legal primacy of marriage itself.
This account of lost promise should not obscure the obstacles that stood,
and still stand, in the way of challenges to marriage’s legal primacy. True,
marriage has ceased to be obligatory and permanent and no longer dictates sex
and gender roles. 464 But as a primary vehicle for managing and privatizing
dependency in the absence of a robust welfare state or other social supports for
families, marriage remains central to American political economy as well as a
unique source of legal and cultural legitimacy. Threatening marital supremacy

461. On the benefits and costs of riskier arguments, see, for example, Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Risky Arguments in Social-Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 2087 (2014).
462. Cf. Gordon, supra note 9.
463. As Douglas NeJaime has shown, marriage cast a long shadow over the LGBT rights
struggle long before marriage equality became a prominent movement goal, as campaigns for nonmarital recognition shaped marriage’s meaning and vice-versa. See Douglas NeJaime, Before
Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 87 (2014).
464. On the malleability of marriage’s internal infrastructure, see, for example, Mary Anne
Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005).
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was and is therefore perceived by many as an assault on the very foundation of
society. Progressives, then and now, often join conservatives and traditionalists
in policing the boundaries between marriage and non-marriage, even if they
disagree about who should be able to marry and what roles husbands and wives
should assume.
Marriage equality—and gender equality within marriage—certainly need
not come at the expense of nonmarital children and their parents. Indeed,
marriage equality has radical and transformative, as well as conservative,
potential. 465 But the history of the illegitimacy cases suggests that focusing on
the harm to (presumptively innocent) children while downgrading or penalizing
their parents’ nonmarital (and presumptively not so innocent) relationships has
destructive symbolic and material consequences for nonmarital families.
Plaintiffs attacking illegitimacy penalties won significant victories, to be sure,
and they made understandable strategic decisions along the way. The story told
here makes clear, though, that winning is not everything: the terms on which
marriage equality becomes part of our constitutional culture will help to
determine whether same-sex couples’ access to marriage is the latest chapter in
the history of marital supremacy or the opening salvo in a renewed battle for
racial, sexual, and economic justice.

465. On the potentially progressive implications of the marriage equality movement’s success
for nonmarital families, see, for example, Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. (2016); see also Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay
Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2015) (showing how early same-sex marriage
litigation reflected the more radical aims of the 1970s gay liberation movement); Cary Franklin,
Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014)
(arguing that the marriage equality movement’s success has had salutary implications for LGBT
individuals and families that reach far beyond marriage). On the need to address discrimination against
nonmarital families alongside or in the wake of marriage equality, see Courtney Joslin, Marital Status
Discrimination 2.0, 95 B.U. L. REV. 805 (2015); Widiss, supra note 7.

